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Protecting Global Financial Market Stability and
Integrity:
Strengthening SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds
Thomas C. Pearson and Julia Lin Pearsont
ABSTRACT
Hedge funds are complex financial products which have grown
exponentially during the past decade. While hedge funds provide
benefits to the world's capital markets, they also pose challenges.
The potential risk to the stability of the world's financial system
combined with an increase in hedge fund fraud led the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to attempt to regulate hedge
fund advisers. After the court rejected the SEC's expansion of its
regulation, the SEC adopted regulations that insufficiently address
the problems posed by hedge funds. This article proposes more
effective solutions involving a coordinated- international approach
to hedge fund regulation. The hedge fund regulations proposed in
this article aim to achieve a reliably stable financial system,
financial market integrity through greater transparency, and
protection for all investors from fraud.
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I. Introduction
Hedge funds conjure up vivid images of easy money,
enormous profits, risk to the world's financial stability, notorious
secrecy, and exotic offshore locations.' Some people believe that
given the lack of meaningful governmental regulation existing
over hedge funds, these funds represent the unknown: the "'wild,
wild west"' of the financial world,2 the "black hole of the
I See Sir John Gieve, Deputy Governor, Bank of England, Speech at the HEDGE
2006 Conference: Hedge Funds and Financial Stability (Oct. 17, 2006).
2 Shaheen Pasha, FBI Sees More Indictments from Backdating, CNN MONEY.COM,
[Vol. XXXI
2007] REGULATING HEDGE FUNDS
international financial system,"3 or a "dark, shadowy world with
no legitimacy.",
4
In their diversity, hedge funds defy definition and are often
classified by their characteristics. They are closed-end, private
investment vehicles with "accredited investors," they engage in
active trading, and they charge performance-based fees.5 Hedge
funds are known for using leverage,6 short-selling, 7 and other
sophisticated techniques to maximize financial returns.
Hedge funds are distinguishable from other investment
Oct. 12, 2006, http:l/money.cnn.com/2006/10/12/news/companies/whitecollar
_crime/index.htm (citing a statement by Chip Burrus, an Assistant Director of the FBI);
see also David Goldstein, Better the way it was, 25 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 53, 53 (2006)
(citing a characterization of hedge funds by U.S. Sen. Orrin Hatch).
3 Hedge-Funds Crisis Breaks Into the Open, EXEC. INTELLIGENCE REV., June 17,
2005, at 14 (citing the statement of Jochen Sanio, President of the German financial
supervision agency BaFin). "In Europe and Japan, political leaders denounce hedge
funds as locusts, parasites and predators .... Critics label [hedge funds as] fair-weather
friends who dominate trading in good times but, when difficulties arise, liquidate in
haste, accelerate the fall, and multiply the damage." Adam Lerrick, Demystifying Hedge
Funds, AEI POLICY SERIES, May 15, 2006, at 6, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/
20060512_LerrickNPNRFinal.pdf.
4 See Elliot Wilson, Cultivating Chinese Hedges, ASIAMONEY, Oct. 2006, at 24
(quoting a Hong Kong-based hedge fund manager's description of traditional Chinese
attitudes).
5 See David A. Vaughan, Partner, Dechert LLP, Selected Definitions of "Hedge
Funds," Comments for the SEC Roundtable on Hedge Funds (May 13, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.htm (citing fourteen different
definitions of hedge funds found in government and industry publications). The term
"hedge fund" is not defined in securities laws. Id. Even the hedge fund industry has not
agreed on a single definition of a hedge fund. See INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS,
TECHNICAL COMM., THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOR HEDGE FUNDS: A SURVEY AND
COMPARISON (FINAL REPORT) 12 (2006) [hereinafter IOSCO], available at
http://www.iosco.org/tibrary/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD226.pdf.
6 "Leverage exists whenever an entity is exposed to changes in the value of an
asset over time without having first disbursed cash equal to the value of that asset at the
beginning of the period." COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP, TOWARDS
GREATER FINANCIAL STABILITY: A PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVE app. a, at a-I (2005),
http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/docs/CRMPG-II.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2007)
[hereinafter CRM POLICY GROUP II]. Leverage can exist through borrowing, shorting
stocks or bonds, or using derivatives. PHILIPP VON COTTIER, HEDGE FUNDS AND
MANAGED FUTURES 163 (Paul Haupt 1997).
7 "Shorting" is selling stock the seller does not own. In doing so, the seller is
betting that the price of the stock will fall and the same seller can buy it back later at a
lower price. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.200(a) (2007).
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products. 8 They are unlike mutual funds because mutual funds are
highly regulated investment vehicles. Mutual funds only invest in
stocks and bonds, and provide liquidity for investors by permitting
redemption on a daily basis.9 The differences are especially
noticeable in liquidity and leveraging practices, as well as in the
fees charged to investors.'l Hedge funds are also distinguishable
from frivate equity funds. Hedge funds invest in a variety of
assets and may even make private equity investments, but they
do not commit to invest in a business over its life. 12 Unlike mutual
funds, hedge funds and private equity funds have escaped
meaningful government regulation.
Little government regulation of hedge funds currently exists.13
The lack of regulation has provided hedge funds with an
advantage of lower costs compared to traditional investments,
8 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., STEERING GROUP ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES FOR
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH ABOUT PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS
AND "ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS" 17-20 (2007), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/11/39007051 .pdf. Venture capital investments
represent longer time-frame investments than do hedge funds and offer business advice
to the entrepreneurs. See Mark Heesen, The Slippery Slope of Hedge Fund Regulation,
44 VENTURE CAPITAL J. 71 (2004).
9 Also, a mutual fund often has an unlimited number of investors, is available to
the general public, and usually has less leverage than a hedge fund. Alan L. Kenard, The
Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAX LAWYER 133, 133 (2003); see also Tamar
Frankel & Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Mysterious Ways of Mutual Funds: Market
Timing, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 235, 239 (2006).
10 See Inv. Co. Inst., The Differences Between Mutual Funds and Hedge Funds,
http://www.ici.org/funds/abtlfaqs-hedge.htm (last updated Apr. 2007).
ii See SEC. & EXCH. COMM., DIV. OF INV. MGMT & OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE
INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 4 (2003)
[hereinafter SEC STAFF, 2003 REP.], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies
/hedgefunds0903.pdf. The SEC staff reviewed sixty-five hedge funds advisers who
managed about 650 hedge funds with $160 billion in total assets. Id. at vii.
12 Phaedra Hise, Your New Bankers: Hedge Funds, FORTUNE SMALL BUS., Dec. 8,
2006. See generally Steven E. Hurdle, Jr., A Blow to Public Investing: Reforming the
System of Private Equity Fund Disclosures, 53 UCLA L. REV. 239, 241-43 (2005).
13 Some argue that indirect regulation of hedge funds occurs because their prime
broker is regulated. Imposing further disclosure obligations on the prime broker is an
easy way to acquire information about hedge fund activities. See Anthony Hanlon,
Proposals for Reform of Hedge Fund Regulation 108 (Apr. 24, 2002) (unpublished
LL.M. written work requirement submission, Harvard Law School), available at
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfs/tony-hanlon.pdf.
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such as stocks and bonds, and other "alternative investments.
' '1 4
Hedge funds are often described in extremes.1 5 Hedge funds
are "the new barbarians, rattling the gates of entrenched corporate
management."' 16 They are "the lords of havoc" who are described
as having potential responsibility for the next great crash. 17 More
favorable references to hedge funds include describing them as
"the financial system's benevolent fire fighters"' 18 in creating a
market for buying risky assets, such as stocks of "distressed
companies.' 19 The widespread disparity in opinion contributes to
the, lack of Congressional consensus for stronger government
regulation.
.Important advantages to the financial markets are provided by
hedge funds. They make the financial markets more efficient by
aligning prices across markets. 20 By actively participating in
secondary markets and the market for derivatives, hedge funds
14 "Alternative investments," which are generally the investments not regulated by
the SEC, include hedge funds, real estate, private equity, and venture, capital. See Bryan
M. Place, Alternative Investments offer New Options for Investors, CENT. N.Y. Bus. J.,
Aug. 3, 2007, at 6.
15 See, e.g., Laura Santini, Would You Like Hedge Funds With That Deal? WALL
ST. J., Nov. 30, 2005, at CI ("[Hedge funds are] the fast-food consumers. of the financial
world gorging on quick trades that can create market volatility."); Neil Weinberg &
Bernard Condon, The Sleaziest Show on Earth, FORBES, May 24, 2004, at 110
(discussing the lack of regulation of the hedge fund industry).
16 See Alan Murray, Hedge-Fund Lessons from the Icahn Affair, WALL ST. J., Feb.
22, 2006, at A2. .
17 See Janet Bush, Sell-Out: Why Hedge Funds Will Destroy the World, NEW
STATESMAN, July 31, 2006, at 26. Hedge funds can represent a "tsunami of 'hot money'
.crashing in and rolling out as fast as it arrived." Id. at 28.
18 Sebastain Mallaby, Hands Off Hedge Funds, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2007,
at 91.
19 Distressed companies are those in need of legal action or business restructuring
to revive their financial stability. Hedge funds that buy the stock of distressed
companies "do their homework, spotting sources of cash and earnings that a troubled
company can use." Karen Richardson, Street Sleuth: New Way to Play Distressed
Firms: Acquire the Stock, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2006, at C1.
. 20 Federal Reserve's Second Monetary Policy Report for 2004: Hearing on
Oversight on the Monetary Policy Report to Congress Pursuant to the Full Employment
and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 108th Cong. 35 (2004) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.).
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bring market liquidity to the capital markets.21 They also play an
important role in financial innovation and the reallocation of
22financial risk. Because of the benefits provided by hedge funds,
any regulations should not eliminate their ability to positively
impact the financial markets.
Business is impacted by hedge funds in several ways.23  As
activist shareholders, 24 hedge funds have pressed for corporate
reforms, such as removing under-performing chief executive
officers25 or forcing companies to streamline operations 26 and
return the cash to shareholders as dividends.27 Hedge funds have
21 SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 4.
22 Id.; see also Hee Chul Kang, The Current State of Equity Investments by Foreign
Funds in South Korea and Related Legal Issues, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 73 (2006).
23 See generally Andrew M. Kulpa, The Wolf in Shareholder's Clothing: Hedge
Fund Use of Cooperative Game Theory and Voting Structures to Exploit Corporate
Control and Governance, 6 U.C. DAVis Bus. L.J. 78 (2005).
24 About one hundred activist hedge funds existed in 2006. See Curtis G. Carlson,
Be Prepared, DAILY DEAL, Dec. 14, 2006. Activist hedge funds take large ownership
positions in companies. Their goal is to try to force changes in the companies by
proposing new strategies, negotiating with management, initiating proxy battles, or even
taking control of companies. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in
Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1028 (2007).
Hedge funds buying more than five percent of a company's stock and disclosing their
intention to influence the management of the company to the SEC were successful in
getting the target company to acquiesce to their demands in sixty percent of cases. See
April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Hedge Fund Activism 27 (European Corporate Governance
Institute Working Paper Series in Finance, Paper No. 140/2006, 2006),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=913362 (follow "Download
Document" hyperlink; then follow "Social Science Research Network" hyperlink).
However, if a proxy vote is needed, activist hedge funds are less successful because
many institutional investors routinely vote with management. See Laura Santini,
Investor Activism Grows Globally, But Wins Are Rare, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2006, at Cl.
25 In Germany, hedge fund pressure removed Deutsche Borse CEO Werner Seifert.
See Alan Murray, Business: Heinz Is Better Served With Peltz Outside of the Board
Room, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2006, at A2.
26 Hedge funds have significantly impacted the auto parts industry restructuring.
Jeffrey McCracken et al., For Car Industry, Sum of the Parts May Be a Lifeline; Hedge
Funds, Buyout Companies Line Up to Pour Billions of Dollars Into Slimmed Down
Suppliers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2006, at C1.
27 Hedge funds as bond-holders are demanding immediate payout of debt when a
technicality arises for default. See Peter Lattman & Karen Richardson, Hedge Funds
Play Hardball with Firms Filing Late Financials, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2006, at Al.
For example, when a public company does not timely file its financial statements with
the SEC, some hedge funds then extract substantial fees from the company or higher
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determined the survival of many businesses through start-up
28 29ventures, mergers and acquisitions, and bankruptcy creditor
committees. 30  The aggressive tactics used by some hedge funds
have caused controversy, particularly in Asia.31  As financiers,
hedge funds provide a new avenue for financing risky ventures
like producing films 32 and acquiring transfer rights in professional
athletes.33 Because hedge funds have achieved higher than normal
returns during the past decade, their sophisticated investment
strategies now serve as role models for others by applying
"modem portfolio theory. '34 As a result, some convergence now
interest rates from the company's bonds, in exchange for an extension of their default
deadline. Id.
28 Rebecca Buckman, Need Cash? Call a Hedge Fund: Some Young Tech
Companies Move Beyond Venture Capital, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2006, at Cl. Unlike
venture capitalists, hedge funds offer little experience dealing with small, private firms
which often need nurturing to succeed. See Margot Patrick, Hedge-Fund IPO Is the
Latest Test for Nascent Sector, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2006, at C12.
29 See Chris Kentouris, Political Chill Hits Hedge Fund 'Locusts,' SECURITIES
INDUSTRY NEWS, May 30, 2005, at 12 (discussing Deutsche Borse's alleged takeover of
the London Stock Exchange). Target company managers often find hedge fund
shareholders "uncooperative and disruptive." William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and
Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1381 (2007).
30 See Stephen Taub, Hedge Fund Bankruptcy Role Seen Probed, CFO.COM, Nov.
29, 2005, http://www.cfo.comarticle.cfn5244187/c_5242799. Hedge funds investing
in distressed debt sometimes convert their debt holdings into control of a company if the
company re-emerges from bankruptcy. See Henny Sender, A Company's Road to
Restructuring May Teem With Hedge Fund Potholes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2006, at C1.
31 "In Japan, . . . [hedge fund] activism has generated two different reactions."
Young-Joon Kim, Hedge Funds Spur Business Debate in Asia, INT'L FIN. L. REV., June
2006, at 19, 21. Some Japanese believe that hedge funds provide the external pressure
for needed reform. Id. Other Japanese believe the law should provide more effective
defenses from hedge fund attacks. Id. The aggressive tactics used by hedge funds have
also caused controversy in Korea. See Laura Santani & Jason Singer, Icahn's Push in
Korea Shows Rise of Raiders is Roiling New Markets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2006, at At.
32 Pierre Paulden, Coming to a Fund Near You, 40 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 22
(2006); see also Kate Kelly, Creative Financing: Defying the Odds, Hedge Funds Bet
Billions on Movies, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2006, at Al.
33 Gregory Zuckerman & Keith Johnson, Pure Play in Soccer: Hedge Fund Invests
in Portuguese Stars, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2006, at Al.
34 See Institutional Demand for Hedge Funds 2, INSTITUTIONAL DEMAND FOR
HEDGE FUNDS UPDATE (Bank of N.Y., New York, N.Y. & Casey, Quirk & Associates,
Darien, Conn.), Oct. 2006, at 18, http://www.adrbny.comlfiles/
BNYHedgeFundWhitePaper2006.pdf. Modem portfolio theory concludes that an
investment portfolio is less volatile by adding noncorrelated investment assets, even if
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. XXXIII
exists between hedge funds and other financial products.35
Hedge funds also have a major societal impact. They have,, • • • ,,36
created a new class of wealth, the "centimillionaires. Just as the
"net entrepreneurs" symbolized the 1990s, the international hedge
fund managers may come to symbolize the brightest in the current
decade. 37  Without adequate regulation to safeguard against
potential abuses, the success of hedge funds may diminish, similar
to the struggles of the net entrepreneurs after the dot-com crash in
2000.
Major problems stemming from hedge funds include the risk
of destabilizing the financial markets through "systemic risk,"38
exploitation of conflicts of interest, and outright securities fraud.
39
Losses to investors resulting from fraud in hedge funds between
those individual assets individually have higher volatility. See Harry Markowitz,
Portfolio Selection, 7 J. OF FIN. 77, 89 (1952).
35 Increased convergence exists between hedge funds and other categories of
financial products, such as private equity funds and mutual funds. See ALTERNATIVE
INVESTMENT EXPERT GROUP TO THE EUROPEAN COMM'N, MANAGING, SERVICING, AND
MARKETING HEDGE FUNDS IN EUROPE 4 (2006),
http://www.hedgeweek.com/reports/index.jsp (follow "Report of the Alternative
Investment Expert Group to the European Commission Managing, Servicing and
Marketing Hedge Funds in Europe.pdf' hyperlink) [hereinafter ALT. INV. GROUP];
Jonathan Bevilacque, Convergence and Divergence Blurring the Lines Between Hedge
Funds and Private Equity Fund, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 257 (2006). An example of
convergence is the "130/30 funds" which allow mutual funds to include a moderate
amount of leverage and some shorting. See Emma Trincal, The Face of Convergence:
New SEC Rules May Boost Nascent 130/30 Market, HEDGEWORLD, Dec. 27, 2006.
36 See lanthe Jeanne Dugan & Anita Raghavan, The Atlas of New Money: Awash
in Cash, Hedge-Fund Moguls from Greenwich to Hong Kong Reshape the World of
Weath, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2006, at Al.
37 Julian Delasantelles, Speaking Freely: Hedge Funds Playing Dice With the
Investor, ASIA TIMES, July 6, 2006, at 4, available at
http://www.atimes.con/atimes/Global-Economy/HG06Dj02.htm; accord Peter Walker,
The Latest MBA Must Have Job, CNN.coM, Jan. 18, 2007, available at
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/BUSINESS/01/12/execed.private/index.html.
38 Systemic risk is the possibility of correlated defaults among financial institutions
over a short period of time, often caused by a single major event creating a financial
shock that presents a danger of inflicting significant damage to the financial system and
real economy. Nicholas Chan et al., Do Hedge Funds Increase Systemic Risk?, 91 ECON.
REV. 49, 49 (2006); Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk in Financial Markets: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 104 (2007) (statement of E.
Gerald Corrigan, Managing Director, Goldman, Sachs & Co.).
39 See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman, Hedge Fund Fraud is Alleged by SEC, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 10, 2005, at C6.
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2000 and 2004 exceeded $1.1 billion.40 Over $1 billion of these
losses were caused by hedge fund investment advisers who were
not registered with the SEC.4 1 Market instability and significant
instances of fraud highlight the need for more stringent regulation
of hedge funds.
The SEC concluded in 2004 that some light regulation of
hedge funds was needed because of hedge fund fraud, indirect
sales of hedge funds to the ordinary investing public, and the
enormous size of the hedge fund industry.42 However, the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in June 2006 overturned the
SEC's first attempt to regulate most hedge funds.43 Thus, the SEC
was forced to drop its regulation of hedge fund advisers in 2006.
Instead, in 2007, the SEC adopted a regulation that extended the
anti-fraud portion of the securities law to hedge funds44 and
proposed regulations to restrict which "individuals" could
purchase hedge funds.45
This article examines how to improve the regulation of hedge
funds in the global economy in order to ensure more stability and
integrity in the financial markets. Proper regulation will make
investing in hedge funds safer and more transparent, while still
enabling hedge funds to continue to provide their substantial
benefits to the financial markets.
Part II of this article examines hedge funds' characteristics,
epitomized by their power, riskiness, and mysteriousness. Part III
identifies the problems that have arisen from hedge funds, such as
40 Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. 72,054, 72,056 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275, 279)
[hereinafter SEC Hedge Fund Adviser Rule].
41 Id. at 72,078. Almost half of the SEC's enforcement actions against hedge funds
involved false documentation by a hedge fund attempting to hide fraud. SEC STAFF,
2003 REP., supra note 11, at 74. One third of the actions involved criminal charges. Id.
42 See SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note I1, at 89. It is expected that the hedge
fund industry will exceed $3 trillion in a few years and $6 trillion by 2015. Testimony
Concerning Hedge Funds Before the Subcomm. on Securities and Investment of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Susan
Ferris Wyderko, SEC Director, Office of Investor Education & Assistance), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts05 l606sfw.htm.
43 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
4 17 C.F.R. § 230.206(4) to 230.206(8) (2007).
45 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007).
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endangering the markets, engaging in fraud, and providing losses
caused by lack of risk management. Part IV explores the lack of
regulation of hedge funds under current U.S. securities laws and
the SEC's regulatory attempts.
Part V proposes a three-part solution for controlling hedge
funds: (1) a coordinated international approach, (2) adding
prudential regulation to reduce both systemic risk to the financial
system and fraud to the investors, and (3) enhancing market
integrity regulation to ensure efficient markets that can assist
investors and the public. The ultimate goals are to acquire greater
transparency for the financial markets to operate effectively, to
generate more accountability from hedge funds, and to preserve
the fundamental benefits that hedge funds offer to the financial
system.
II. Characteristics of Hedge Funds
Evolving from their origins as hedging transactions that were
designed to lessen risk in portfolios,4  hedge funds have existed
for almost 60 years.47 During the last decade, hedge funds have
become a major economic force, having established a record of
46 Hedge funds originally employed a hedging strategy of making additional trades
to counterbalance any risk in the existing portfolio. See Willa Gibson, Is Hedge Fund
Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 684 (2000). Traditionally, hedge funds
were generally defined as any pooled investment vehicles that were "privately organized,
administered by professional investment managers, and not widely available to the
public." PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS,
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 1 (1999)
[hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT I], available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf (the Working Group
consists of representatives from the SEC, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury Department).
47 Alfred Winslow is generally credited as having founded the first hedge fund in a
limited partnership in 1949. See Hearing on Regulation of the Hedge Fund Industry
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 14 (2004)
(statement of Charles J. Gradante, Managing Principal, The Hennessee Group LLC),
available at http://banking.senate.gov/_files/gradante.pdf. It was not until the stock
market boom of the late 1960s that private investment entities generally began adopting
hedging and arbitrage techniques. See Memorandum from William H. Heyman, SEC
Director of Market Regulation, & Marianne K. Smyth, SEC Director of Investment
Management, to SEC Chairman Breeden 1 (June 12, 1992) ("In the 1970s and 80s, the
activities of hedge funds broadened into other activities."), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/s73004-34.pdf. See generally William Fung
& Daniel A. Hsieh, A Primer on Hedge Funds, 6 J. OF EMPIRICAL FIN 309, 311 (1999).
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producing higher returns than traditional investments in stocks and
bonds.48 Investors like the fact that hedge funds provide portfolio
diversification through financial returns not generally correlated
with the traditional financial returns from investments in stocks
and bonds. 49  Hedge funds represent a paradigm shift5° to
alternative investments in an effort to take advantage of modem
financial instruments and techniques, such as options,
51
derivatives, 52 arbitrage, 53 and shorting.
54
48 See Daniel Capocci & Georges Hubner, Analysis of Hedge Fund Performance,
I I J. OF EMP. FIN. 55, 56-57 (2004). But see Anne Tergesen, It's Gloomy In These
Hedges: For Retail Investors, Hedge Funds of Funds Aren't Paying Off, BUSINESS
WEEK, Oct. 23, 2006, at 134.
49 See SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 5.
50 See Melanie Merrifield & Nancy C. Godson, Finance to the Rescue, BAYLOR
Bus. REv., Sept. 2005, at 2; Fin. Services Auth., Hedge Funds: A Discussion of Risk and
Regulatory Engagement 5 (Fin. Services Auth., Discussion Paper No. 05/4, 2005),
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp05_O4.pdf.
51 Options enable recipients to buy stock in the future at the price on the date the
option was granted. Options trading has expanded over fifty percent since 2004. See
Annette L. Nazareth, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the Securities
Industry Association Options Market Structure Conference (Oct. 24, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch 102406aln.htm.
52 Derivatives are financial instruments that derive their value from hedging the
risk of owning an underlying asset which is subject to unexpected price fluctuations. See
generally Robert F. Schwartz, Monitoring a Game of Winks, Nods, and Risk: Derivatives
Regulation in the E.U. and Poland, 2 BYU INT'L L. & MGMT REv. 233, 239-41 (2006).
An estimated two quadrillion dollars in derivative trades occur per year. Hedge Fund
Crisis, supra note 3. In the first half of 2006, the use of derivatives in the United States
grew at the fastest pace in eight years. See James Quinn, Paulson Probes Leverage, THE
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 26, 2007, at CI.
53 Arbitrage takes advantage of usually small price differentials existing between
two markets by buying from one market and immediately selling to the other. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 99 (7th ed. 1999).
54 See Amendments to Regulation SHO and Rule 1Oa-l, Exchange Act Release No.
54,891, [2006-2007 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 87,719, at 83,840-41
(Dec. 7, 2006). Reg. SHO regulates short-selling and applies to hedge funds and the rest
of the securities industry. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.200 (2006). Reg. SHO allows market
makers to "short-sell naked," shorting without having to borrow the underlying security.
See Chidem Kurdas & Christopher Faille, SEC Proposal May Cause New Short Squeeze,
HEDGEWORLD, Jan. 12, 2007. The SEC is concerned about short-selling in selected
circumstances and has proposed barring a short sale in the five day period before a stock
offering. See Short Selling in Connection with a Public Offering, Exchange Act Release
No. 54,888, [2006-2007 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) T 87,718, at 83,826
(Dec. 6, 2006) (proposing the amendment of 17 C.F.R. § 242.105).
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As financial products, hedge funds usually demonstrate similar
characteristics. They exhibit power by engaging in high-speed
computerized and leveraged trading activity in order to take
advantage of short-term market inefficiencies of diverse risks or
complex financial products, as discussed in Part V.a.55  Hedge
funds are very risky, as explained in Part V.b. They are also
mysterious because they provide very limited information about
their portfolios while they operate in a complex international
environment, as examined in Part V.c.
A. Powerful Due to Size, Growth, and Strategies
Hedge funds have become an important component of the
global financial capital markets. About sixty percent of the
roughly two trillion dollar hedge fund industry 6 is based in the
United States.57 The financial impact of hedge funds far exceeds
their size because they trade so much.58 Hedge funds account for
between one-third and one-half of the trading volume on the
London 59 and New York Stock Exchanges. Also, hedge funds
55 See IOSCO, supra note 5, at 29-32 app. d (identifying hedge fund characteristics
in various countries).
56 See Chidem Kurdas & Bill McIntosh, HF Asset Levels Much Higher,
Administrators Report, HEDGEWORLD (July 27, 2007). It is expected that the hedge fund
industry will exceed $3 trillion in a few years and $6 trillion by 2015. Testimony
Concerning Hedge Funds, supra note 42.
57 Hedge fund assets in the world are roughly divided as follows: United States
62%, Europe 26%, Asia-Pacific 10%, and other areas 2%. Ferrel Daste, Director,
Deutsche Bank Hedge Fund Capital Group, The Role of Capital Introduction in the
Growth of the Hedge Fund Industry 2 (2006) (Deutsche Bank advertisement). More
investments from the Middle East and Asia, especially India, are expected. Neil
Behrman, Middle Eastern Institutional Hedge Fund Demand Could Rise to 14% of
Global Total, INFOVEST21 NEWS (HedgeWorld), Dec. 19, 2006; Rajesh Abraham, Hedge
Funds Wait for India to Open, INDIA LTD., Dec. 4, 2006, available at
http://www.rediff.com/money/2006/dec/04hedge.htm; Margot Patrick, Hedge Funds for
the Masses; U.K. Weighs Broadening Range of Products Individuals Can Buy, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 24, 2006, at C12.
58 SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 2.
59 London is the capital for European hedge funds, while New York and its
Connecticut suburbs are the center for U.S. hedge funds. See Dugan & Raghavan, supra
note 36.
60 David Chapman, Bullion Mgmt. Group, Inc., Roaring Government Bond Market
(July 1, 2005), http://www.bmsinc.ca/content/view/194/33/. One hedge fund's frantic
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are dominant in select markets: they represent most of the
trading in "convertible bonds ' 62 and half of the trading in
commodities. 6 3
Hedge funds hold a huge amount of assets, mostly due to their
dramatic growth worldwide in the past decade. Especially since
2000, hedge fund assets have grown much faster than most
assets.64 Hedge fund assets are about twice the size of private
equity funds65 and represent about fifteen percent of mutual fund
assets.66  Hedge funds have grown even faster in certain
trading on the New York Stock Exchange was rumored to account for almost three
percent of the daily trading. Alan Murray, Hedge Funds Need to Open Up, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 5, 2006, at A2.
61 Greenwich Associates estimates that hedge funds account for about eighty
percent of the trading in distressed debt. Role of Hedge Funds in Our Capital Markets:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking
Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Patrick M. Parkinson,
Deputy Director, Federal Reserve Board, Division of Research and Statistics), available
at http://federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2006/20060516/default.htm.
62 See Anita Raghavan, Hedge Fund GLC Is Probed on Role of a Star Trader,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2005, at Cl. "Convertible bonds" are bonds with an embedded
option that can turn the bond into stock at a predetermined price. See VON COTrlER,
supra note 6, at 133. Convertible bonds were popular with hedge funds because trading
strategies enabled funds to make money off of small movements in the price of the bonds
or the underlying stock. See Alistar MacDonald, Street Sleuth: Burst of New Convertible
Bonds Jump-Starts Gains for Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2006, at C3. The lack
of new convertible bonds and relatively stable equity markets forced some hedge funds
into other investment strategies in 2005. See id.; see also Henny Sender, Hedge Funds
Skid on Convertible Bonds, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2004, at C4.
63 See Demystifying Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities and
Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 3
(2006) (statement of Adam Lerrick, Director, Gailliot Center for Public Policy),
available at http://banking.senate.gov/_files/ACF82BD.pdf. See, e.g., Ann Davis, New
Exotic Focus for Hedge Funds: Uranium Market, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2007, at Al
(discussing hedge fund investment in the energy sector).
64 Hedge funds have historically yielded double digit returns. See Nicholas Chan et
al., Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds I (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No.
4535-05, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=671443 (follow "Download Document" hyperlink; then follow "Social
Science Research Network" hyperlink). See also Steven Brull, Hedge Fund Holdouts,
39 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 22, 23 (2005).
65 Shareholder Activism, Hedge Funds, and Securities Law Developments,
Presentation at the Federal Securities Institute 15 (Feb. 16, 2006) (on file with author).
66 Mutual funds represent almost $10 trillion in assets. See Judith Burns, SEC to
Revisit Independence Rule; Fund-Governance Measure Revives Contentious Issue As It
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geographic areas67 such as Asia.68
The growth in hedge funds is partly attributable to the investor
base expanding beyond wealthy individuals. 69  For example,
institutional investors now represent the majority of investment in
70U.S. hedge funds, with the rest of those funds owned by
individual investors.71  Institutional investors include university
endowment foundations,72  pension funds,73  life insurance
Gets Its Third Look, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2006, at C13.
67 Canada presents an example of the dramatic growth in hedge funds. Within the
last five years, Canadian hedge funds have increased to $40 billion. David Clarke,
Toronto Hedge Funds May Take on New York, CANADIAN HEDGE WATCH, Nov. 20,
2006. Canadian hedge funds also accounts for about one-third of the Canadian stock
market activity. James L. McGovern, Hedge Funds Market Poised for Tremendous
Growth, HEDGEWEEK, Jan. 1, 2005, available at http://www.hedgeweek.comlarticlesl
detail.jsp?contentid=15393&livehome=true.
68 For example, assets in Hong Kong based hedge funds jumped from almost $2
billion in 2000 to almost $16 billion in 2005. See Amanda Cantrell, Hedge Funds Make
Big Bets on China boom, CNN MONEY, Apr. 24, 2006, available at
http://money.cnn.com2006/04/24/markets/hedgefundschina/; Asian Interest Fuels
Growth in Cayman Islands Hedge Fund Industry, PR NEWSWiRE, Feb. 22, 2005,
available at http://prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=140381 (stating that Asian
hedge funds increased over 400% from 1999 to 2004). Asian regulators have begun to
express specific concerns about the hedge fund industry. See Alexa Lam, Executive
Director, Intermediaries and Investment Products, Securities and Futures Commission,
Address: The Outlook and Regulatory Challenges for the Fund Management Industry in
Hong Kong (Jan. 18, 2007), www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/speeches/speeches/
07/speech-18 0107.pdf (expressing concern about hedge fund side-letters, valuations,
and substandard offering documents).
69 Investment in hedge funds is limited to wealthy individuals because of high
minimum investment requirements, like the U.S. "accredited investor" standards,
imposed by many governments. See infra p. 58 and notes 289-90 and accompanying
text.
70 Alex R. McClean, Note, The Extraterritorial Implications of the SEC's New Rule
Change to Regulate Hedge Funds, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 105, 113 (2006) (citing
FRANCOIS-SERGE LHABITANT, HEDGE FUNDS: QUANTITATIVE INSIGHTS 11 (John Wiley &
Sons 2004)).
71 Individual ownership in other major countries range from a low of 16% in Japan
to a high of 67% in Australia. See Financial Services Agency (Japan), Office of
International Affairs, Summary of Hedge Fund Survey Results and Discussion Points
(Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/newsletter/2006/03c.htmi; Big
Hitters, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2006, at 79 (discussing the high level of individual
investment in hedge funds in Australia).
72 Large university endowment foundations have invested over one-third of their
portfolio in alternative investments. Martin van der Werf, Endowments Earned 10.7
Percent in 2006, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 5, 2007. For example, Princeton
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companies,74 and others.75  Institutional investors are expected to
continue increasing their share of hedge fund investments in the
future,76  despite a lack of information about hedge fund
investments that makes it difficult to fulfill any fiduciary
University has invested almost half of its portfolio in hedge funds. Hedge Funds and
Systemic Risk in the Financial Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial
Services, 110th Cong. 112 (2007) (statement of Andrew K. Golden, President, Princeton
University Investment Co.). Yale University invested twenty-five percent of its $18
billion portfolio in hedge funds. YALE UNIV., THE YALE ENDOWMENT 2005 19 (2005),
available at http://www.yale.edu/investments/Yale-Endowment_05.pdf; E. S. Browning,
Boola, Boola: The Yale Money Management Fad, WALL ST. J, Dec. 2, 2006, at B3.
73 U.S. pension funds started ramping up their investment in hedge funds after a
2002 report by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation concluded a potential pension
crisis was possible. At that time, many pension plans were under-funded, especially
after the stock market declines of 2001. Following the issuance of the report, pension
trustees generally became more willing to ignore risk and pursue the higher possible
financial returns offered by investment in hedge funds. See Michele Weldon, The Quest
for Higher Returns Leads Investors to Alternatives, 172 PwC EVENTS AND TRENDS 10, 12
(2003). Subsequent changes in accounting for pensions have also motivated some
pension plans to take more risk and invest in hedge funds. See Bank of New York, supra
note 34, at 13. For example, in 2004, pension fund assets provided about thirty percent
of hedge fund asset inflows. Gregory Crawford, Buying Up: Hedge Fund Success Has
Everyone Wanting In, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Oct. 4, 2004, at 15-18. Shortly
thereafter, pension funds in other countries also began to invest in hedge funds. See,
e.g., Chester Dawson, Japan's Hedge Heyday: Funds are Sprouting and Thriving,
Despite the Red Tape, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Sept. 26, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_39/b3952149.htm.
74 Life insurance companies' investments are often regulated. Thus, life insurance
companies have only a relatively small amount invested in hedge funds. See, e.g., Stefan
Engels, Derivatives Take Larger Role With Hedge Funds, HEDGEWEEK SPECIAL REPORT,
Aug. 2006, at 5, 7.
75 ALT. INV. GROUP, supra note 35, at 4. See also Amy Borrus, Is the Hedge Fund
Party Over?, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/
dnflash/aug2005/nf2005088-7712_dbOI 6.htm.
76 Global institutional demand for hedge funds is expected to triple by 2010. See
Bank of New York, supra note 34, at 13. Kelly Bogdanor, Hedge Fund Headwinds and
Tailwinds: Examining the Impact of Hedge Funds on the U.S. Stock Market, DAIN
RAUSCHER PRIVATE CLIENT EQUITY RESEARCH, Nov. 17, 2006, at 3; JPMORGAN ASSET
MGMT., INSIGHTS: U.S. MID-SIZE INSTITUTIONS INVESTING SURVEY (2006),
www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/amia/research-and-publications/survey-reports
(follow "U.S. Mid-Size Institutional Investors Respond" hyperlink). Similarly, only
forty percent of Europe's largest institutional investors had invested in hedge funds. See
Informed Portfolio Management, Regional Differences Highlighted as European
Institutions Continue to Move Into Alternative Investments, Survey Reveals (2004) (on
file with author).
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responsibilities.77
It is not just the size of hedge funds that has increased. The
number of hedge funds worldwide now exceeds 13,000.78  The
U.S. market accounts for about seventy percent of these hedge
funds.79  Larger hedge funds are typically defined as those
exceeding $10 billion, and midsize funds are defined as those
exceeding $1 billion. The average size of a hedge fund, however,
just exceeds $100 million.80 Thus, ten percent of the hedge funds
hold about ninety percent of the total hedge fund assets. 8' Leading
investment banks and securities dealers have played a major role
in expanding the investment in hedge funds. 82 Each year roughly
ten percent of the hedge funds close down, 83 but new funds
77 See Anne Tergesen, Big Risk on Campus, BUSINESS WEEK, May 15, 2006, at 32.
78 Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk in the Financial Markets: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 123 (2007) (statement of George E. Hall,
Managed Fund Association). Approximately 3,000 hedge funds existed in 1998.
WORKING GROUP REPORT I, supra note 46, at 1.
79 Pratima Desai, Man Group Says Hedge-Fund Fraud a U.S. Phenomenon,
REUTERS, Mar. 2, 2006, available at http://www.libertypost.org/cgi-
bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum= 131593.
80 NORTHERN TRUST, THE 'FORCED' INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE HEDGE FUND
INDUSTRY 4 (2006), http://www-ac.northerntrust.com/content//media/attachment/data/
white-paper/0606/document/whitepaper hedgefunds.pdf.
81 See John Wilkinson, Fund of the Fund the Best Hedge Fund Strategy,
MONEYMANAGEMENT.COM, Aug. 7, 2006, http://www.moneymanagement.com.au/
Articles/Fund-of-fund-the-best-hedge-fund-strategy_0c04383b.html. Bogdanor, supra
note 76, at 3 (stating that 300 hedge funds having more than $1 billion each manage
ninety percent of hedge fund assets).
82 For example, the Bank of New York has grown hedge fund assets under its
administration to over $100 billion, the vast majority of which occurred in the last five
years. See Bank of New York Tops $100 Billion in Hedge Fund Assets, PR NEWSWIRE,
Jan. 24, 2007.
83 See Alistair Barr, Hedge Fund Launches, Liquidations Drop in 2006, HFR Says,
MARKETWATCH, Mar. 29, 2007. Hedge funds are routinely shut down because they are
unable to deliver consistently positive returns. CHRISTOPHER B. PHILIPS,
UNDERSTANDING ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS: A PRIMER ON HEDGE FUND EVALUATION 3
(Vanguard Inv. Counseling & Research 2005). Many hedge funds fail "because they
couldn't manage their business." See Scot Blythe, Pitfalls of Hedge Fund Investing: A
Trustee's Guide to Alternative Investments, Part III, BENEFITS CANADA, Nov. 2005, at
AG 1, AG2, http://www.benefitscanada.com/news/article.jsp?content=20060714
140710_4896. In tracking a group of 331 hedge funds for almost one decade, noted
Princeton University economist Burton Malkel, who authored A RANDOM WALK DOWN
WALL STREET, found that less than twenty-five percent of the original hedge funds were
still reporting. Brull, supra note 64, at 7.
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constantly open up.84
Various investment styles and strategies are used by hedge
funds, 85 and they often use complex mathematical models.
86
Strategies include market-trend or directional strategies
87
(exploiting broad market trends in equities, interest rates, or
commodity prices), event-driven strategies 88 (exploiting discrete
84: Press Release, Hedge Fund Intelligence, New Hedge Fund Launches Slow (Feb.
7, 2007) (on file with author) (stating that, in 2006, eighty-two new U.S. hedge firms
were launched, raising $34 billion). Overall, the start-up size of hedge funds continues
to increase. Id. In 2006, one hedge fund was started with a' record high $6 billion in
investment. Emma Trincal, The Hedge Fund Report: Graduating from Harvard, THE
STREET.COM, Feb. 13, 2006, http://www.thestreet.com/markets/hedgefunds/10268102.
html (stating that the record-breaking fund was created by the former manager of
Harvard's endowment). Twelve years earlier, $6 billion represented the largest hedge
fund in existence; whereas, in 2007, a $6 billion hedge fund would not make the list of
top fifty U.S. hedge funds. See Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk in the Financial
Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 135 (2007)
(statement of Jeffrey L. Mathews, General Partner, Ram Partners, LP).
85 SEC STAFF, 2003 REP. supra note 11, at 4. Different research groups categorize
the basic investment strategies differently. For example, while Tremont Capital
identifies nine strategies, the Henesee Group classifies twenty-three strategies. PHILIPS,
supra note 83, at 5. Two-thirds of large hedge funds pursue multiple strategies. See
Heidi Moore, Wall Street's Prime Cut, DAILY DEAL, June 27, 2005.
86 See, e.g., Randall Smith, Goldman Gurus Strike It Rich With Hedge Fund;
Global Alpha's Stellar Returns Means Pay-Dirt for Ex-Academics; The Envy of Wall
Street Firms, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2006, at Cl. Goldman "quants" first built
mathematical models for hedge funds. See id. In some financial markets, it's also
important to have more than mathematical models, such as having investigators who
provide on-the-ground research. See Mindy Rosenthal, China Bound, 31 INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR 97, 98 (2006).
87 In 2004, market-trend strategies represented 47% of the hedge fund assets
(market-trend strategies include long/ short, 42%, and other strategies, 5%). See Nadja
Pinnavaia, Hedge Fund Strategies, Goldman Sachs, Presentation at the U.K. and Irish
Pensions and Investing Summit: Taking the Plunge: Entry Strategies for Hedge Fund
Exposure 4 (2004), http://www.iapf.ie/Events/RecentEvents/
UKIrishlnvestingPensionsSummit-Oct 18-19/file,693,en.pdf.
88 Event driven strategies have increased from nineteen percent of hedge fund
assets in 1995 to twenty-five percent in 2006. Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk in the
'Financial Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 71
(2007) (statement of Stephen J.'Brown, David S. Loeb Professor of Finance, NYU Stern
School of Business) [hereinafter Brown]. Thus, the U.K. Financial Service Authority
recently announced that it was increasing the number of hedge fund managers under
supervision in an effort to monitor the growing influence of these event-driven funds.
See Melanie Feisst, Watchdog Widens Scrutiny as Managers Wield More Influence,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 29, 2006, at C 1.
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events such as bankruptcies, mergers, and takeovers), arbitrage or
relative-value strategies (exploiting pricing discrepancies between
closely related securities), 89 and global or macro strategies
(exploiting macroeconomic opportunities in global equity, fixed
income, currency, and commodities markets). 90 The strategy or
strategies used by a hedge fund may attract a particular type of
investor.
91
A contributor to the increased growth in the hedge fund
92industry is the "Fund of Funds" (FOFs). FOFs are a mix of
hedge fund investments 93 which represent over one-third of the
total investment in hedge funds.94 FOFs offer the advantages of
89 SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 35-36. In 2004, relative-value
strategies represented twenty-two percent of the hedge fund assets. Pinnavaia, supra
note 87.
90 Karim Rozwadowski & Brynjar Pdtursson Young, Buyout Competition: The
Emergence of Hedge Funds in the World of Private Equity, J. OF PRIVATE EQUITY,
Winter 2005, at 67, 68-69. Macroeconomic strategies have dramatically fallen during
the past decade from nineteen percent of hedge fund assets down to three percent.
Brown, supra note 88, at 71. "Macro hedge funds enjoy extraordinary flexibility
regarding investment policy and investment strategies." VON COTTIER, supra note 6, at
139. Macro hedge funds are often large and appear in the media more frequently than
other hedge funds. Id.
91 For instance, institutional investors generally look for a low volatility, absolute
return stream of income. See Jenny Anderson, Hedging '06: Year to Read the Caveats,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006, at C1. For example, New Mexico's $13 billion pension plan
has $1 billion invested in hedge funds. However, the N.M. pension plan decided against
investing in emerging markets. Scott Patterson, Cocktail of Hedge Funds, Emerging
Markets Is a Risky Mix But the Big Investors Love It, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2006, at CI.
92 FOFs are generally regulated. See, e.g., Fund of Fund Investments, Investment
Company Act Release Nos. 33-8713, IC-27,399, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,640 (effective July 31,
2006) (adopting new rules relating to fund-of-funds investments). FOFs often provide
better redemption terms than hedge funds. However, FOFs may have more restrictions
on leverages, short-selling, and other risk-taking activities. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL
BANK, LARGE EU BANKS' EXPOSURES TO HEDGE FUNDS 41 (2005), available at
www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/otherlargeeubanksexposureshedgefunds2005l len.pdf. Some
divide FOFs into two basic categories: diversified and niche. The assets of diversified
FOFs are invested in various types of hedge funds. Niche FOFs invest all their assets in
hedge funds of a similar type. Lipper HedgeWorld, Lipper HedgeWorld's Education
Center: Fund of Funds, www.hedgeworld.com/education/index.cgi?page
=fundfunds (last visited Sept. 9, 2007).
93 FOFs typically invest in fifteen to twenty-five hedge funds. SEC STAFF, 2003
REP., supra note 11, at 67.
94 Loch Adamson, Cultural Divide, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 13, 2006, at 50,
53 (citing figures from Chicago-based Hedge Fund Research).
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lower minimum investment amounts 95 and less risk through
investment diversification. FOFs have the disadvantage of
charging higher investment expenses and having even less
transparency than individual funds, which are often opaque. Many
investors start their investments in hedge funds by purchasing
FOFs.96 FOFs will likely continue to grow, especially as their
visibility increases through listing on European stock exchanges.
97
B. Risky Due to Activity, Leverage, and Operations
Active trading through substantial, computerized, short-term
trading characterizes many hedge funds. Thus, the investment
positions within a hedge fund are frequently changed.98 Some
funds even employ split-second trading strategies in which a
computer program decides when the hedge fund will buy or sell
securities. 99 Active trading by a hedge fund can diminish if they
are facing credit limits or if market liquidity disappears.
100
High leverage is characteristic of many hedge funds but varies,
in part, depending on the investment strategy used.101 Leveraging
of assets enables hedge funds to expand their trading activity.
Hedge funds obtain leverage not only by borrowing, but also
through various risky means such as purchasing securities "on
95 FOFs can have a minimum investment level as low as $25,000. Francois-Serge
Lhabitant, Interview: The Future Is Bright, the Future Is Hedge Funds: An Interview
with James R. Hedges IV, President and Chief Investment Officer of LJH Global
Investments, 46 THUNDERBIRD INT'L Bus. REV. 1 (2004). See also SEC STAFF, 2003
REP., supra note 11, at 69 (detailing initial investment requirements of an FOF).
96 FOFs' initial value was to secure investor access to the best funds, which were
otherwise unavailable. See Edmond Warner, To the Point, These Replication Hedge
Funds Are the Real Thing, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 8, 2007, at 5.
97 See Arindam Nag, For Some Funds of Funds, Public Is Peachy, BARRON'S, Oct.
30, 2006, at 36; James MacIntosh, The London Stock Exchange Join Fight to Host
Alternative Funds, FIN. TIMES, July 12, 2007, at 17.
98 See WORKING GROUP REPORT I, supra note 46, at 5.
99 See Aaron Lucchetti, Firms Seek Edge Through Speed As Computer Trading
Expands, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2006, at Al.
100 See WORKING GROUP REPORT I, supra note 46, at 5.
lo, See SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 37. Hedge funds are classified as
"highly leveraged institutions" by the Bank for International Settlements (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision). BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, BANKS' INTERACTIONS WITH HIGHLY LEVERAGED INSTITUTIONS 8
(1999), www.bis.org/publlbcbs45.pdf.
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margin," °2 shorting securities, and using repurchase agreements
and derivative contracts. 10 3  Leveraging enables hedge funds to
seek greater returns but also enhances the risk for large economic
impact if losses result. 1°4  Leverage also increases the risk when
the assets held are illiquid. 10 5  "Hedge funds are limited in their
use of leverage only by the willingness of their creditors and
'counterparties ' 1 6 to provide such leverage." °7  Leverage is
sometimes created through relaxed margin or collateral
requirements. 18 Government regulations should seek to limit
excessive leverage used by many hedge funds.
Employees in a hedge fund are very few, despite the fact that
hedge funds often supervise substantial assets. 1° 9 Hedge fund
employees are often hired through private networking within the
investment banking community or even through nepotism. 110 The
fund manager is an investment advisor who determines the hedge
fund's investment strategies, provides day-to-day management of
the investments, and arranges the outside service providers. 111
102 Buying on margin involves borrowing money from a stock broker to purchase
the securities.
103 Gibson, supra note 46, at 686-87.
104 See Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, As Funds Leverage Up, Fears of Reckoning
Rise, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2007, at Al.
105 See SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 37.
106 Counterparties extend credit to hedge funds through credit lines and manage
their financial exposure by using various safeguards, such as due diligence, disclosure,
collateral practices, credit limits, and monitoring. WORKING GROUP REPORT I, supra note
46, at 7.
107 Id. at 5. Registered investment companies, however, are subject to borrowing
and leverage restrictions. See Recent Developments in Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 34 (2003) (statement of
William H. Donaldson, SEC Chairman).
108 See SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 38.
109 Seventy percent of investment advisers report having ten or fewer employees.
See Investment Advisers Now Manage $31.4 Trillion, PENSION BENEFITS, Oct. 2006, at 6.
Depending on the hedge fund's size and its strategies, the fund manager may oversee
portfolio managers, provide financial engineering expertise, and direct portfolio
managers to employ particular investment strategies or focus on particular industries.
See SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 10.
110 Grace Wong, Why A Job in Private Equity Pays, CNN MONEY, Feb. 13, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/02/13/markets/pe-jobs/index.htm.
III Among the over 10,000 investment advisers registered with the SEC, almost
one-quarter manage hedge funds. See Judith Bums, Hedge Funds Pump Up Ranks of
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Some hedge fund managers were formerly talented mutual fund
portfolio managers or proprietary traders12 who were lured away
by hedge funds' promise of more lucrative entrepreneurial
opportunities. 113  However, some managers have little relevant
experience.11 4 Hedge funds that are regulated each have a "Chief
Compliance Officer" (CCO)," 5 who is viewed by the SEC as its
"'partner in the protection of investors. ' 6  The tendency of
hedge funds to have few employees increases the need for
government regulation to assure adequate staffing of personnel
necessary in order to maintain proper internal controls and legal
compliance.
Hedge funds employ third parties, including prime brokers. A
prime broker is an investment bank or brokerage firm that serves
as the major outside service provider for hedge funds. The prime
broker executes the trades ordered by the hedge fund manager
17
and often facilitates the financing and risk management for the
SEC Registry, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2006, at C9. "Offshore hedge funds typically
contract with an investment adviser, which may employ a U.S. entity to serve as
subadviser." SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 10.
112 Arguably, some mutual fund managers move to hedge funds to escape mutual
fund regulation limits. See Eric J. Greupner, A Call for Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1555, 1574 (2003).
113 See Keith Button, Growth in Hedge Funds Lures Wall Street (Dec. 26, 2004) (on
file with author). Similarly, hedge funds have changed the nature of Wall Street equity
research. Industry. analysts are under more pressure to supply short term trading ideas to
hedge fund clients. See Bogdanor, supra note 76, at 3.
114 Not requiring relevant knowledge or experience from a manager invites scam
artists to enter the hedge fund industry.
115 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 (2007).
116 Steven J. Tsimbinos & Scott H. Moss, Managing a Hedge Fund as a Registered
Investment Adviser: Avoiding Common Pitfalls, in LIPPER HEDGEWORLD, SEC
REGISTRATION REPORT 2005-2006 78 (2005) ("[The SEC] expects the CCO to (1) be
respected in his or her organization, (2) have support from the highest levels of
management, (3) have enough power, responsibility and authority ... , (4) have
sufficient resources . . . . and (5) be independent of business units."); see also
Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg.
74,714 (Dec. 24, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7 (2007)); Gene Gohlke,
Associate Director, SEC Office of Compliance Inspection and Examinations, Address at
Managed Funds Association Educational Seminar Series 2005: Procedural Guidance for
Hedge Fund CCOs Under the SEC's New Regulatory Framework (May 5, 2005),
http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch050505gg.htm.
117 See Prime Brokerage Debate: The Race to Keep Up With the Clients,
EUROMONEY, Nov. 2006, at 92; SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 1.1, at 53-55.
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hedge fund transactions.1 18  Prime brokers generate about $10
billion per year from servicing hedge funds. 119 For the three major
largest brokerage firms,' this represents about one-third of their
revenues. 12  Thus, there is often a conflict of interest between the
largest hedge funds and prime brokers because of this mutually
beneficial relationship. 22  The potential for a conflict of interest
raises the concern of whether these prime brokers will exercise
independence. Government regulation of hedge funds is needed to
assure that prime brokers do not compromise their fiduciary duties
in the interest of their own financial benefit.
118 Prime brokers often provide intra-day credit to facilitate foreign exchange
payment. See Hanlon, supra note 13, at 28-29.
119 Press Release, TABB Group, Hedge Funds Now Spend $10 Billion on Prime
Brokerage, $1 Billion on Data, and $500 Million on SEC Registration as Expansion to
New Markets Continues Says TABB Group Report (May 10, 2006),
http://www.tabbgroup.com/PageDetail.aspx?PagelD=16&ItemlD=59; see Hedge Funds
and Independent Analysts: How Independent are Their Relationships: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 0 9 th Cong. 16-19, 97-111 (2006) (statement of Gary
Aguirre, Former Investigator, SEC), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/chearings/109scat2.html (follow "PDF" hyperlink under
"Hedge Funds and Independent Analysts: How Independent are Their Relationships?").
Mr. Aguirre, in his written testimony, stated that hedge funds paid $25 billion to Wall
Street banks in 2004. Id. at 102; see also Liz Moyer, Hedge Hogs, FORBES, June 28,
2006, http://www.forbes.com/business/2006/06/28/hedgefund-senate-regulations-
cx-lm_0628hedge.html.
120 Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and Bear Steams control more than sixty
.percent of the prime brokerage market. Pascal Lambert, Trends in Prime Brokerage,
HEDGE FUNDS REV., Aug. 2005, at 2, 3, available at www.incisivemedia.com/hfr/
specialreport/primebroking.pdf; Bill McIntosh, JP Morgan Exploits Derivatives Trading
Growth, HEDGEWORLD, Dec. 28, 2006.
121 See Alix Nyberg Stuart, Are Your Secrets Safe? CFO, Oct. 2006, at 64, 64.
122 As evidence of this cozy relationship, the two largest hedge fund managers are
subsidiaries of investment banks: Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan. See David Enrich,
J.P. Morgan Climbs Hedge Fund Ranks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at B5.
Massachusetts regulators have determined that at least one hedge fund was paying for
office space through higher than normal trading fees with their prime broker and not
disclosing the arrangement to investors. See John Hechinger, Hedge Funds Gift Grabs,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, June 28, 2007, at C3; Jenny Anderson, Banks' Leases to Hedge
Funds Are Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2007, at Al. The SEC Staff has expressed
concern about a quid pro quo for a hedge fund's placement in a prime broker's preferred
list. See SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 85. Gatekeepers often become
advocates for their clients, rather than watchdogs for the public. See Robert Prentice,
The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for Independent Auditing, 61
OHIO ST. L.J. 1597, 1640 (2000).
REGULATING HEDGE FUNDS
Many other outside service .providers also assist hedge funds.
The offshore fund administrator calculates the net asset value of a
hedge fund's holdings and maintains the financial information and
records. 23  A few countries, such as Ireland, Bermuda, and the
Cayman Islands, have thriving fund administration and financial
reporting businesses. 24 Legitimate concerns about the
independence of the professional work conducted in these offshore
tax haven countries increase the need for government regulation of
hedge funds.
External auditors are sometimes hired to audit the financial
statements prepared by the fund administrators. 2 5 Legal counsel
is needed to establish the business, conduct certain business
transactions, and address various legal issues. 126  Additional
specialized expertise is sometimes acquired by a hedge fund,
particularly for investing in technology and the acquisition of
timely market data. 127 Hedge funds have become the prime clients
123 The fund administrator should also provide information directly to the fund
auditors. For an example of an offshore fund administrator helping to circumvent proper
audits and allow the fund manager to perpetuate crime, see Fin. Asset Mgmt., Inc.,
Securities Act Release No. 8052, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 45,224,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2007, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-
10,670, 76 SEC Docket 1421-3 (Jan. 3, 2002).
124 Fund administration is often handled in Ireland, the Cayman Islands, or
Bermuda. Cayman Panel Gives Hedge Fund Industry Mixed Bill of Health, CAYMAN
ISLANDS SUPPLEMENT, Apr. 2006, at 4, 5, available at
http://incisivemedia.com/hfr/specialreport/Caymans2006.pdf.
125 Ninety-five percent of U.S. domestic hedge funds use one of five accounting
firms to perform annual audits. See Gradante, supra note 47, at 6. Trustees of a hedge
fund should hire the auditors to serve as independent watchdogs to protect the interests
of the hedge fund shareholders. See generally F. Scott Thomas & John C. Jaye,
Conve'rting Hedge Funds Into Mutual Funds - A Primer, J. OF INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE,
Dec. 22, 2005, at 25 (analyzing the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
126 "A small group of law firms with long ties to hedge funds managers dominate
the business." Amy Kolz, Hedged Bets, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Apr. 1, 2006, at 104.
The legal work for hedge funds has changed as hedge funds become more involved with
distressed debt, derivatives, and private equity. Id. U.S. law firms are expanding in Asia
to assist their hedge fund clients acquisitions, corporate buyouts, and financial
restructurings. See Margot Patrick, U.S. Law Firms Expand Operations in Asia, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 18, 2006, at C4.
127 See Tabb Group, supra note 119 (stating that $1 billion was invested by hedge
funds in technology and information). For other examples, see Brody Mullins, Hedge
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of outside service providers because they provide substantial work
and are often less price-sensitive than other clients.'
28
Unusually lucrative fees are typically paid to hedge funds.'
29
Hedge funds typically charge 1% or 2% management fees and a
20% performance fee for fund earnings over a certain
benchmark. 30  Therefore, successful hedge fund investment
advisers are the most highly compensated group in the already
high paying financial services industry.' 3' FOFs charge investors
even higher rates. 132 The enormous fees collected have enabled
hedge funds to cover their high administrative CoStS 133 and to pay
Funds Hire Lobbyists to Gather Tips in Washington, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2006, at Al;
Francisco Guerrera, Hedge Fund's Hired Gumshoe to Give Lowdown on US Executives,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at 1.
128 See Nina Mehta, The Trillion-Dollar Payoff, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct.
2005, at 70; Chris Clair, Hedge Funds Altering European F] Scene, HEDGEWORLD, Dec.
21, 2006; Janet Lewis, Shark on Shark Investment Banks Are Still Trying to Suss Out
How to Treat Hedge Funds: As Clients or Rivals, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, Nov.
2005, at 1.
129 Besides management and performance fees, some hedge funds impose additional
fees, such as up-front sales fees and redemption fees. See Canadian Securities
Administrators, Hedge Funds, Staff Notice 81-316, Jan. 12, 2007, available at
www.sfsc.gov.sk.ca/ssc/files/nat-noti/81-316.pdf.
130 Eurekahedge, Frequently Asked Questions, www.eurekahedge.com/news/faq.asp
(last visited Sept. 9, 2007); Christine Williamson, Psst! That Will Be an Extra 8%,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Aug. 7, 2006, at 3. Hedge funds often use a "hurdle rate" and
a "high-water mark." Id. A "hurdle rate" is a minimum rate of return prior to applying
the performance fees. Often the hurdle rate equals some variable index, such as a
floating interest rate. Id. A "high-water mark," requires the hedge fund to recover any
losses and return to the last high-water mark before fully imposing the performance fees.
Id. Thus, performance fees are often eliminated or reduced when the hedge fund makes
money back that was previously lost. See Amey Stone, Hedge Funds, Fees Down?
Close Shop, Bus. WEEK ON-LINE, Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/
dnflash/aug2005/nf2005088_1711_db042.htm (citing an explanation by Ron Geffner,
attorney for hedge funds at Sadis & Goldberg). When losses are small, high-water marks
help to encourage the hedge funds to work harder for the investor; but when losses are
large, high-water marks may encourage the hedge fund to close down. See Edward
Chancellor & John Christy, Exile for a Failed Hedgie?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2007, at
C10.
131 Compensation for the top twenty-five hedge fund advisers averaged $363 million
in 2005. Adam Shell, $363 is Average Pay For Top Hedge Fund Managers, USA
TODAY, May 26, 2006, at BI.
132 FOFs often charge up to an additional one percent management fee and an extra
ten percent of the profits. PHILIPS, supra note 83, at 19.
133 See COTTIER, supra note 6, at 31.
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the highest salaries for top talent. 134 The lucrative compensation
structure also provides incentives to hedge fund managers who
attempt to maximize high financial returns for the hedge funds,
135
even when the transactions represent risky behavior. The SEC
notes that these performance fees create an environment where
hedge fund advisers have tremendous financial rewards if
successful, and little to lose if not.'
36
C. Mysterious Due to Secrecy, Off-shoring, and Complexity
Deeply mysterious and bordering on sinister is the public
image of the hedge fund business.' 37 This mysteriousness arises
from hedge fund secrecy, routine off-shoring of hedge fund
administration, and other complexities in understanding hedge
funds' structures and values. An EU official argues that hedge
funds have an image problem because they have failed to promote
their contributions to society. 138  However, hedge fund secrecy
poses more risks for financial stability now that the industry has
grown so large and powerful. Government regulation can mandate
some financial disclosure to help prevent hedge fund secrecy from
undermining the integrity and stability of the global financial
markets.
Hedge funds release only limited information, hiding their
trading activities and assets from the public, regulators, and often
134 Hedge funds pay professional employees roughly 50% to 100% more than
investment firms. Hedge funds reward fixed-income professionals with an average
annual salary of $210,000 and an average bonus of $625,000. Christopher O'Leary,
Hedge Funds. Big Question New Research Shows Just How Large a Role Hedge Funds
Have in the High Yield Market Today, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIGEST, Oct. 2, 2006, at 7.
135 This behavior is sometimes referred to as hedge funds seeking "absolute
returns," rather than the more prudent financial returns based upon risk. See SEC STAFF,
2003 REP., supra note 11, at viii.
136 SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 62 n.213.
137 Jenny Anderson, Hedge Funds Walk a Hard Line Between Silence and Sharing,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at 7.
138 See Tobias Buck, Hedge Funds and Private Equity 'Are Good for the Market,'
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007, at 6 (interview with Charles McCreevy, EU Commissioner for
Internal Market and Services). The SEC's restrictions on general solicitation by private
funds contributes to the atmosphere of secrecy surrounding hedge funds. See Hedge
Funds and Systemic Risk in the Financial Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Financial Services, I I0th Cong. 12 (2007) (statement of James Chanos, Chairman,
Coalition of Private Investment Companies).
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even from their investors. 139  To protect proprietary trading
strategies, hedge funds typically disclose very limited information
to the public and the government about their investment strategies
and financial results. 0 Although hedge funds often communicate
with investors through investment newsletters and password
protected websites, 14 1 they also may decline to share even basic
information about their fund with the investors.
Secrecy is further promoted by hedge funds through the
substantial use of "side letter" agreements that give selected
investors more favorable terms, but are not disclosed to other
investors. 14 2  Similarly, hedge funds may hide poor performing
assets in "side pocket" accounts to exclude them from affecting
the funds value for purposes of calculating performance fees.
14 3
Hedge funds are international in nature and are often legally
domiciled offshore in a tax haven country144 and managed in a
139 Secrecy exists with hedge funds in order to protect proprietary trading strategies;
thus, even the hedge funds' investors often receive very little information. See SEC
STAFF, 2003 REP. supra note 11, at 46-47. Only in the past few years has some hedge
fund data become publicly available through data vendors such as Hedge Fund Research
and TASS. See Mila Getmansky, Andrew W. Lo & Shauna X. Mei, Shifting Through
the Wreckage: Lessons from Recent Hedge Fund Liquidations 2 (Nov. 14, 2004),
http://web.mit.edu/alo/www/Papers/fail5.pdf.
140 See SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, 46-47.
141 Id. at 45.
142 Deborah Brewster, Hedge Fund Agreements Receive Close Scrutiny: Side Letters
Which Provide Some Investors With Favorable Terms, Are an Area of Regulatory
Concern, FIN. TIMES, June 22, 2006, at 27. Side letters have become common
particularly for redemption terms and fees. Pension investors might require side letters
requiring more frequent pricing information and more information about investment
strategies. See Side Issues, CAYMAN ISLANDS SUPPLEMENT, Apr. 2006, at 14, available
at http://incisivemedia.com/hfr/specialreport/Caymans2006.pdf. Some side letters raise
legal issues. For example, Goldman Sachs is alleged to have made secret agreements
with hedge funds to buy Lazard stock and immediately sell it back to Goldman, creating
the appearance of an active market for the stock. See Lazard Ltd. v. Wasserstein, 415 F.
Supp. 2d 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
143 Roel C. Campos, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remaiks at the SIA Hedge
Funds & Alternative Investment Conference (June 14, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch06l406rcc.htm. Some hedge funds are
placing as much as twenty-five percent of their investments in side pocket accounts. See
Gregory Zuckerman & Scott Patterson, Street Sleuth: Side-Pocket Accounts of Hedge
Funds Studied, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2006, at C3. Side pocket accounts are also used to
make investments in illiquid assets. Side Issues, supra note 142, at 14.
144 SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 10.
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different country. 145 Clients and other integral parties often come
from a third country.146 The most popular locations for offshore
hedge funds are the Cayman Islands147 and, to a lesser extent,
other exotic island tax havens. 148 These islands offer sophisticated
financial expertise in an attractive location. They also have
excellent telecommunications infrastructures, beneficial tax laws,
and strong bank secrecy laws.14 9 To a lesser extent, hedge funds
are located in low tax countries, such as Ireland. 15  Several
countries have recently modified their laws to permit hedge funds
to operate in the country and, in turn, attract investors to those
countries. Outsourcing complex back operations for
145 "Although London is a popular location for hedge fund managers, hedge funds
themselves are not established in the U.K. For tax reasons, the funds locate in offshore
jurisdictions .... The fund itself will have its own governance arrangements, which will
operate outside the U.K." Fin. Services Auth., Hedge Funds and the FSA 6 (Fin. Serv.
Auth, Feedback Statement on Discussion Paper No. 16, 2003),
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/fsl6.pdf. Other popular domiciles for hedge fund
managers are the United States and Bermuda. See COMnER, supra note 6, at 75.
146 ALT. INV. GROUP, supra note 35, at 4. For example, a particular unregistered
hedge fund was domiciled in the British Virgin Islands, owned by an Austrian citizen,
and managed by a hedge fund administrator in New York. See Fin. Asset Mgmt., Inc.,
supra note 123. The SEC charged all three parties with fraud. Id. In the release, the
SEC accepted an offer of settlement with the prime broker that held most of the fund's
securities. Id.
147 The Cayman Islands is currently the most popular international location for the
hedge fund industry. The Cayman Islands also services several other specialized
financial industries. Another major reason for the Cayman Island's popularity is its
flexible regulatory environment. See James Eedes, Cayman Islands - Offshore, On
Target, THE BANKER, July 3, 2006, at 106.
148 SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 10. Outside of the United States, the
British Virgin Islands used to capture the most hedge fund business, as measured by the
number of funds; the Netherlands Antilles held the greatest amount of hedge fund assets.
See COTIER, supra note 6, at 74, 101.
149 Eedes, supra note 147.
150 Dublin, Ireland is a major offshore financial center for the administration of
alternative investment funds: firms in Ireland administer about twenty-five percent of the
world's hedge fund investments. See Damian Neylin, PricewaterhouseCoopers,
Regulatory Frameworks - A Key Challenge for the Hedge Fund Industry, FINANCE
DUBLIN, July 2004, available at http://www.pwc.com/extweb/service.nsf/docid/
2DAD30CIF5F5EFEF80256ED9002B2988; see also Mark Hutchinson, Hedge Funds:
An Irish Perspective, 24 IRISH J. OF MGMT. 55 (2004). Ireland is considered a "quality
regulator," which enables institutional investors to shorten the due diligence period they
need before investing. See Rita Raagas de Ramos, Singapore Market Proposes Listing
of Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2006, at B3.
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administratively valuing hedge fund assets increases the
mysteriousness and financial risk presented by hedge funds.
151
Not only is the hedge fund industry secretive, but the
accounting and financial reporting of a hedge fund's profits is also
complicated 152 for four major reasons. 153  First, hedge funds
usually involve extensive trading, so there are many transactions
to analyze and record. 154  Second, hedge funds are subject to
complicated accounting requirements that arise from a hedge
fund's use of derivatives. Third, hedge funds often lack the
151 ARMELLE GUIZOT, THE HEDGE FUND COMPLIANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT
GUIDE 74 (John Wiley & Sons 2007).
152 Hedge fund accounting is a significant reason for SEC investigations and a
contributing factor for a significant number of financial restatements by public
companies. See Timothy S. Kviz, Professional Accounting Fellow, Office of the Chief
Accountant, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the 2006 AICPA National
Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments (Dec. 11, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/2006speech.shtml (follow "Remarks
Before the 2006 AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB
Developments" hyperlink).
153 Errors are common in the accounting for hedge fund transactions. Errors often
arise because of complexities, particularly in international business transactions and the
accounting for derivatives. For example, a survey conducted by the "International
Swaps and Derivatives Association" revealed that twenty percent of the credit
derivatives traded in 2005 were initially recorded erroneously. Richard Beales, Equity
Derivatives Face Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2006, at 15. However, accounting
complexity gives an advantage to those who intend to misuse the rules. Freddie Mac:
Accounting Standards Issues Raised in the Doty Report: Testimony Before the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 18 (2003) (statement of Baruch Lev,
Professor, Stern School of Business).
154 Documentation required under International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) and International Accounting Standards (IAS) for hedge fund accounting should
include a risk management objective and strategy, identification of the hedging
instrument, the related hedged item or transaction, the nature of the risk being hedged,
and how the entity will assess the hedging instrument's effectiveness. See John
McDonnell, Hedge Accounting Under International Financial Reporting Standards,
ACCOUNTANCY IRELAND, Apr. 2004, at 8, 9. The documentation required under the
SEC's derivative accounting policies footnote is somewhat similar. See 17 C.F.R. §
210.4-08(n) (2007).
155 In the United States, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has
issued several lengthy "Financial Accounting Standards" (FAS) relating to derivatives
and hedge funds. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 155: ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN HYBRID FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS (2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas155.pdf; FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 149:
AMENDMENT OF STATEMENT 133 ON DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING ACTIVITIES
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control systems to ensure proper accounting. 156  Fourth, hedge
funds use intricate tax planning structures, adding to the
accounting and financial reporting challenges. 157The financial statements of hedge funds are sometimes neither
based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)"' nor
audited by CPA firms. Investors should be particularly skeptical
(2003), availabl at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fasl49.pdf; FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 138: ACCOUNTING FOR
CERTAIN DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND CERTAIN HEDGING ACTIVITIES (2000), available
at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas138.pdf; and FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD.,
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 133: ACCOUNTING FOR
DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING ACTIVITIES (1998), available at
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas133.pdf. The accounting complexity for derivatives led the
European Union to ignore part of IAS 39 regarding the accounting for derivatives. See
Council Regulation 1606/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 243) (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2002/1_243/1_24320020911 enOO01 0004.pdf;
Commission Regulation 1725/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 261) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2003/1_261/1_26120031013enOOO10002.pdf.
156 An SEC release prompted the FASB in 1998 to issue FAS 133 on the accounting
for derivatives. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 133, supra note 155. The concern was that different
enterprises reported similar derivative activities differently. Furthermore, results of
derivative transactions were often not reported on the income statement. Under FAS
133, hedge fund accounting defers recognizing gains or losses on derivatives. However,
numerous conditions are required, called hedge criteria. Hedge criteria vary depending
on the nature of the risk hedged. The accounting for derivatives depends on how the
hedge is designated. The concern is whether the hedge is an exposure to changes in the
fair value of the recognized asset or liability, or as a hedge to exposure from variable
cash flows of a forecasted transaction. FASB Derivative Accounting Standards: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Protection. of the Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. 9-15 (2003) (statement of Leslie F. Seidman,
Member, Financial Standards Accounting Board).
57 Tax planning concerns include partnership allocations, performance fees against
benchmarks, and realized gains and losses on a trade date basis. Other tax concerns may
arise from interest due to withdrawing partners, loss carryforwards, and trading initial
placement offers. Further issues include amortization of organizational costs, interest
income when earned, tax allocations, and others. Hedge Fund Center, Hedge Fund
Accounting Basics, http://www.hedgefundcenter.com (follow "Basics" hyperlink; then
follow "Hedge Fund Accounting Basics" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2007).
158 See DOUGLAS L. HAMMER, U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 269 (American
Bar Association 2005). In 1997, the SEC criticized corporate "footnote disclosures" on
derivatives as too general. Footnote disclosures are required by FAS 119 on the
accounting policies for derivatives. General disclosures made it difficult to determine
the real financial impact of derivatives on the company. Thus, the SEC took action
within Regulation S-K to require public companies to provide enhanced descriptions of
the accounting policies for derivatives. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-08 (2007).
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of a hedge fund's financial performance. 159  Nevertheless,
investors seeking to redeem an investment from a hedge fund must
rely on the hedge fund's financial accounting. 160  Regulation
requiring audited financial statements would provide greater
reliability of the financial information and would therefore better
protect individual investors.
The complex structure of hedge funds is motivated by tax,
securities law, and business considerations. 161 A typical "domestic
hedge fund," organized under U.S. law, is structured as a limited
partnership with the fund adviser as the general partner and the
passive investors as limited partners. 162 A typical "offshore hedge
fund" uses a master-feeder structure that has two basic feeder
159 Audits of hedge funds' financial statements are not subject to the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board's examination process of auditors.
160 Withdrawal of funds from a hedge fund is often difficult. Investors often have
little control in when to withdraw assets from hedge funds because withdrawals
generally may only be made on a quarterly or monthly basis after the hedge funds have
performed their accounting. See CRM POLICY GROUP II, supra note 6, at B- 15. Also,
hedge funds also may have an initial two year lock-up when no redemption by an
investor is allowed. This lock-up period was partly created as a response to escape the
SEC's first attempt to regulate hedge funds. See Huw VAN STEENIS ET AL., MORGAN
STANLEY, PERMANENT AND STICKIER CAPITAL FOR ALTERNATIVE ASSETS 2 (2006),
http://www.morganstanley.cominstitutional/primebrokerage/pdf/HVanSteenis-July-7-2
006.pdf.
161 See KMPG L.L.P., TAXATION AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF UK FUNDS 17
(2006), http://www.hedgeweek.com/download/36066/
Joint%20KPMG%2OIMA%20TAX%20REPORT.pdf. See generally John W. Haskins,
Comment, The Off-Shore Hedge Fund, 8 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 84 (1969)
(indicating the funding of offshore hedge funds is substantially due to the Foreign
Investors Tax Act of 1966). In the United States, hedge funds want to avoid qualifying
as a retirement plan and having additional onerous fiduciary duties. See IRC § 404(a)(1)
(2000) (enacted as part of ERISA, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974). The Pension Protection Act of 2006 liberalized the ERISA "plan assets" rule, so
that pension plans can own twenty-five percent in a hedge fund, without the hedge fund
becoming a retirement plan. See Deborah Solomon, Congress May Let Hedge Funds
Manage More Pension Money, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2006, at At; Arnold & Porter, LLP,
Pension Legislation to Make Important Changes for Hedge Funds (Aug. 2006),
http://www.arnmoidandporterlip.com/pubs/files/A&PAdvisory-Pension%20Legislation%2
Oto%2OMake%20Important%20Changes%20for%2OHedge%2OFunds.pdf.
162 SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 9. Business considerations include
investor and marketing concerns. Tax issues focus primarily on pass-through
possibilities to avoid double taxation. Securities law considerations include meeting the
requirements for exemption to registration with the SEC. See COTTIER, supra note 6, at
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entities pouring their capital into an offshore master
corporation. 163  One feeder entity exists for both the offshore
investor and tax-exempt U.S. investor. 164 The other feeder is for
the U.S. investor who wants to invest in a feeder that is taxed as a
partnership - usually a limited liability company or private limited
partnership is used 165 in order for the investor to avoid double tax
at the entity level. 166  The master organization then makes the
hedge fund investments and manages both the offshore hedge fund
and the domestic hedge fund. 167
III. Problems With Hedge Funds
Although hedge funds are generally beneficial for the
international financial system, they pose risks to the public.
1 68
Hedge funds can create market calamities and disruptions, as
discussed in Part V.a. Also, hedge funds are particularly
vulnerable to money laundering 169 and terrorist financing. 17  Part
163 See HAMMER, supra note 158, at 106.
164 See Managed Fund Ass'n., Survey of Selected Substantive and Technical Issues
Raised in SEC Comment Letters Re: Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers 6 (Oct. 22,
2004), http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/mfa102204.pdf.
165 PHILIPS, supra note 83, at 4. In Australia, hedge funds are most commonly
structured as trusts. However, also used are corporate structures, typically unlisted and
domiciled in offshore tax havens. Scott McNally et al., The Australian Hedge Fund
Industry, FIN. STABILITY REV., Sept. 2004, at 58.
166 Aude Thibaut de Maisieres, Hedge Funds and Taxes: Tax Planning Strategies
for U.S. Investors in Domestic and Offshore Hedge Funds, CHAZEN WEB J. OF INT'L
BUSINESS, Fall 2003, at 3. An offshore hedge fund eliminates the problem of a
withholding tax on the distribution. Id.
167 See SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 9.
168 See Dan Waters, Director, Fin. Services Auth., Address at the AsiaHedge
Conference: Regulation and Hedge Funds: An Effective and Proportionate Approach for
a Dynamic, International Marketplace (Oct. 19, 2006), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/1019_dw.shtml; Fin. Services Auth.,
supra note 50, at 6-7.
169 Money laundering is the attempt to conceal the source or destination of money
involved in an illegal activity. Money launderers engage in a financial transaction that
"cleans" the money by making it harder to trace. In 2003, the Treasury Department
proposed anti-laundering rules for unregistered investment funds. As of mid-2006,
however, a final version of the money laundering rules for hedge funds still did not exist.
See Chidem Kurdas, New Idea for SEC Registration, HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, July
11, 2006; U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
Frequently Asked Questions: Suspicious Activity Reporting Requirements for Mutual
Funds (Oct. 4, 2006), http://www.fincen.gov/guidance-faqs-sar_10042006.pdf.
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V.b. discusses the risk of hedge fund fraud, whether through
market abuse, conflicts of interest, or tax evasion. Part V.c.
explains how hedge fund problems can impact the ordinary
investing public, such as through losses in pension plans from
hedge fund investments.
A. Financial Shocks and Destructive Market Manipulations
Hedge funds have engaged in activities that have threatened
the financial markets, currency markets, commodities markets, and
real market prices for individual stocks. Hedge funds have the
potential to create financial shock and disrupt the stable
functioning of the financial markets more than other financial
products because they involve greater leverage and risks."' The
increased market volatility posed by hedge funds necessitates
government regulation to reduce risk of market failures and fraud.
A financial shock can occur when a triggering event causes
both sharp declines in the prices of some types of assets and a
simultaneous tightening of credit, such as when margin calls are
made to repay borrowing. These events cause the market to force
entities to liquidate additional holdings, which further depresses
asset prices, evaporates market liquidity, 172 and potentially wipes
out the capital of various entities, leaving those entities bankrupt.
With the growing size of hedge funds, one concern is that
hedge funds will have a herd mentality and take similar financial
positions. Such behavior has the potential to reinforce a market
collapse. While the financial markets and the regulators have
170 See Edmund L. Andrews, Threats and Responses: Money Trail; U.S. Proposes
Hedge Fund Rules to Prevent Terrorist Financing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at A23.
A government official specializing in money laundering reporting in the Cayman Islands
noted the connection between hedge funds and terrorist financing. Especially if the
administrative services are outsourced outside of the United States, a hedge fund makes
it easier to avoid complying with U.S. laws that protect the financial system from
association with terrorist financing. See Maha Khan Phillips, How to Commit Hedge
Fund Fraud, GLOBAL INVESTOR, Oct. 2004, at 31.
171 When hedge funds unwind their leverage, the impact can exaggerate a downturn
in the markets. For example, gold stocks dropped twenty-nine percent in one month,
principally because of hedge fund activity. Bogdanor, supra note 76, at 2.
172 Id. at 5.
173 See Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor, Sveriges Riksbank, Address at a Meeting at
Nordea and the CFA Society of Sweden: Are Hedge Funds Dangerous? 5 (Nov. 24,
2006), http://www.bis.org/review/r061130d.pdf; Naoto Higashio et al., Changes in
Hedge Fund and Investment Behaviour and the Impact on the Financial Markets, BANK
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made progress in containing "financial disturbances," they are not
as successful in preventing the more powerful "financial shocks"
that may occur with little, if any, warning. 1
74
The case of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) first
illustrated the threat to stable financial markets posed by hedge
funds: "[a]lmost all of the country's major financial institutions
were put at risk due to their credit exposure to LTCM."' 175 LTCM
was a well-regarded hedge fund with prominent fund managers.
Several. Nobel Prize winning economists founded LTCM in
1994.176. : Because LTCM used several aggressive trading
strategies,177 LTCM grew substantially in size, partly through
leveraging to create a huge debt to equity ratio. 178
LTCM .collapsed suddenly and created a potential financial
shock with the ability to affect the entire financial system. The
combination of LTCM's risky trading strategies, 179 size, and
leverage made it vulnerable to the market reaction from
unexpected events, such as the devaluation of Russia's currency in
1998. LTCM's debt was not apparent to regulators prior to its
collapse. !8  Because of the global flight to quality investments,
OF JAPAN REV., Dec. 2006, at 3 ("There is a growing perception among market
participants that the investment behavior of hedge funds is gradually becoming more
homogeneous.").
174 See CRM POLICY GROUP II, supra note 6, at 6.
175 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing ROGER
LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT (Random House 2000)).
176 John Meriwether, along with Nobel Prize winners Myron. Scholes and Robert
Merton, created LTCM as a Delaware Limited Partnership that operated a Cayman
Islands partnership. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 31, 32 (Random House 2000).
177 Aggressive trading strategies included "convergence trading" and "dynamic
hedging." Id. at 52, 119.
178 LTCM created a debt to equity leverage ratio exceeding 25:1. U.S. GEN. ACCT.
OFF., LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT REGULATORS NEED TO Focus GREATER
ATTENTION ON SYSTEMIC RISK 7 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/
gg0003.pdf. LTCM had off-balance sheet liabilities exceeding $1 trillion consisting
primarily of future contracts, interest rate swaps, and over-the-counter derivatives. Id. at
6.
179 LTCM relied too much on theoretical market-risk models. See David Shirreff,
Lessons from the Collapse .of Hedge Fund, Long Term Capital Management: Post-
Mortem, http://riskinstitute.ch/146500.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
18o Reporting of the potential financial exposure to LTCM was not apparent because
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LTCM would have failed but for a $3.5 billion bailout by its
investor funds, 181 a bailout that was pressed by the Federal
Reserve of New York. 
182
The banking system feared that the financial collapse of
LTCM could create a wider collapse in the financial markets. The
concern arose because of the possibility of a chain reaction in
liquidity investments, leading to a drop in prices and the need for
other entities to liquidate. The LTCM episode made it clear that
hedge fund failures could disrupt the financial markets on both a
domestic and global level. 183 As a result, a Presidential Working
Group was organized. 184  The Working Group made several
recommendations, including acquiring, more frequent and
meaningful information on hedge funds.'
Fixed rate currency pressure by hedge funds was demonstrated
even before LTCM. 186 Two major examples were the European
Monetary System exchange rate realignments in the early 1990s' 87
and the Asian financial crisis in 1997.188 At the time of the Asian
crisis, Hong Kong's financial secretary called for a coordinated
much of the transactions were with affiliates outside of regulated entities. See U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFF., supra note 178, at 16-19.
18, See Ibrahim Warde, LTCM, A Hedge Fund Above Suspicion, LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, Nov. 1998, available at http://mondediplo.com/1998/11/05warde2.
182 U.S. GEN. Acc. OFFICE, supra note 178, at 1.
183 Id. at 29. The potential collapse of the LTCM fund prompted a review of the
lack of regulatory control over hedge funds. See id. at 30. However, no major legal
changes were made. See id. at 30-31.
184 See WORKING GROUP REPORT I, supra note 46, at viii.
185 Id.
186 Barry Eichengreen & Donald Mathieson, Hedge Funds: What Do We Really
Know?, ECONOMIC ISSUES, Sept. 27, 1999; see also Sherry M. Shore, SEC Hedge Fund
Regulatory Implications on Asian Emerging Markets: Bottom Line or Bust, 13 CARDOZO
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 563, 563 (2005).
187 George Soros' Quantum Fund made $1 billion betting against the Bank of
England's support of the U.K.'s currency. See Timothy O'Brien, He's Seen The Enemy,
It Looks Like Him, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1998, at Mi.
188 The Asian financial crisis led to currency devaluations and stock market crashes
in Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, and other Asian countries. While Westerners primarily
blamed "crony capitalism" for the Asian financial crisis, hedge funds played a notable
role in forcing most governments with fixed rate currencies to float the currency to
reflect market realities. See Brian Caplen, Where Will the Mud Stick?, EUROMONEY,
Feb. 1999, at 44.
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international effort to monitor speculative hedge funds and limit
their access to capital. 189 The foreign currency market has surged
in volume in recent years, primarily due to trading by hedge
funds. As a result, the foreign currency markets have become
more vulnerable to manipulation by hedge funds. Therefore, there
is more need for government regulation and international
coordination to monitor tactics utilized in the hedge fund industry
to influence various financial markets.
Commodities manipulation is easily revealed through hedge
fund failures. Although some hedge funds are regulated by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),19' CFTC
regulation has not prevented hedge funds from significantly
affecting various commodity prices through speculative option
purchases. 192  Amaranth Advisers was a hedge fund which lost
about $6 billion in the natural gas industry in 2006 - about two-
thirds of its capital. 193 Amaranth's attempt to monopolize oil and
gas futures kept such prices artificially high until the hedge fund
had to off-load its assets in distress.' 94  After the Amaranth
189 See Track the Hedge Funds, ASIAWEEK, Oct. 23, 1998, at 60, 60-61.
190 See MARTIN BECK & MAREK MARCINIAK, HEDGE FUNDS ACTIVITY AND
INFLUENCE ON THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET (2006),
http://www.ecb.int/paym/groups/pdf/Hedge-funds-fx-market.pdf. The non-bank
professional trading community now represents more than one-third of the daily trading
in the spot currency market. See CRM POLICY GROUP II, supra note 6, at B-11.
191 Over seventy percent of the largest hedge funds are "commodity pool
operations" (CPOs) under the Commodity Exchange Act. 7 U.S.C. § la(5) (2000); see
17 C.F.R. § 4.10(d) (2007). Registered CPOs have disclosure, record-keeping, and
reporting requirements. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 4.21-4.26 (2007). See generally GuIZOT,
supra note 151, at 5.
192 The CFTC's enforcement activities against commodity pools average ten per
year. Sharon Brown-Hruska, Acting Chairman, Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n,
Keynote Address at the Sec. Indus. Ass'n Hedge Funds Conferece (Nov. 30, 2004). A
substantial majority of these cases involved stealing or the outright misappropriation of
investor funds. Id. See, e.g., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Charges
Utah Resident William D. Perkins With USD 3.4 Million Hedge Fund Fraud,
HEDGEWEEK, Oct. 11, 2006.
193 See Ann Davis et al., Hedge Fund Hardball: Amid Amaranth's Crisis, Other
Players Profited, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2007, at Al. One of the big losers was the
Pension Fund of San Diego which lost more than $100 million from the Amaranth hedge
fund. See Hedge Fund Loss Prompts Call for Regulation (News Hour television
broadcast Oct. 23, 2006).
194 See Dan White, When Hedge Funds Falter, All Bets Are Off, SUNDAY INDEP.
(Ir.), Oct. 1, 2006. Gregory Zuckerman, Outside Audit. How the Wreck from Amaranth
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Advisers scandal emerged, 195 the House of Representatives passed
the Hedge Fund Study Act to request a federal study of the hedge
fund industry.' 
96
The United States Senate Judiciary Committee studied stock
manipulation by hedge funds in June 2006.197 Allegations arose
that powerful hedge funds were manipulating the stock market
prices of individual companies by colluding with supposedly
independent securities analysts.' 98  A lawyer testifying before
Congress explained that hedge funds manipulate stock prices by
selecting a target company (usually high tech, bio-tech, or
pharmaceutical), selling the stock short, and then colluding with a
stock analy'st to prepare a false and negative research report on the
company.199 Once the hedge fund has accumulated a substantial
short position, the analyst's report is widely disseminated.2 °°
These actions cause the price of the target stock to decline and
Was Contained; J.P. Morgan and Citadel Swooped In, Assumed Risk, Proving Markets'
Resilience, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2006, at C3.
195 In Amaranth, financial losses were not disclosed until the final day of the
redemption period for the quarter. See Ann Davis & Henny Sender, Amaranth to
Discuss Losses With Clients; Bid To 'Earn Back' Investors' Trust Could Also Help Alter
Standards on Disclosing Hedge-Fund Data, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2006, at C1.
196 Hedge Fund Study Act, H.R. 6079, 109th Cong., (as passed by House, Sept. 27,
2006).
197 Hedge Funds and Independent Analysts: How Independent Are Their
Relationships?. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006).
198 See, e.g., Henny Sender, Hedge Funds.: Reward and Risk: Behind an Attack on
Farmer Mac - Gotham Partners' Heavy Research Raised Questions, and the Fund Made
Sure Everybody Listened, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2003, at Cl. Similar allegations exist
for the short-selling of stocks outside of the United States. See, e.g., Jesse Westbrook,
Hedge Funds Withdraw SEC Registrations After Ruling, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 22, 2006,
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid
=aK65W2d5dv2s (discussing the investigation of Aeneas Capital Management and its
bets on Malaysian stocks).
199 SEC regulations, however, require analysts to certify the truthfulness of their
position expressed in research reports and other media. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.500-242.505
(2007); see William 0. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice In a
Time of Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 965-66 (2005).
200 Similarly, a lawsuit alleged that a hedge fund employed a secret agent to
blackmail employees of a company that the hedge fund was short selling. Lawyers
claimed that such nefarious activities are not uncommon in the world of short selling.
See Christine Seib, Hedge Fund Faces Lawsuit Over 'Dick Tracy' Allegations, TIMES
(London), Aug. 19, 2006, at 57.
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enable the hedge fund to profit.201  Government regulation
targeting these tactics could deter hedge funds and stock analysts
from colluding and manipulating stock prices for their financial
gain.
The fundamental assumption of securities law - that
stockholders vote in accordance with their economic interests - is
undermined by techniques that some hedge funds are using to
manipulate stock values of individual companies. 202 Two recently
revealed techniques used by hedge funds are "empty voting
2°3
and "vote morphing. ' '204  These techniques borrow shares to
acquire added voting power, while simultaneously shorting the
underlying stock so as to use the voting power to undermine the
company's position and then profit when the company's stock
subsequently drops. "Empty voting usually doesn't trigger current
disclosure rules because these rules do not cover borrowed stock
or derivatives holding" unless an investor owns more than five
percent of the stock. Many hedge funds remain just under that
threshold level and use empty voting to enlarge and hide their
voting power.
B. Fraud and Its Opportunity Through Conflicts of Interest
Fraud requires incentive, opportunity, and rationalization,
201 Marc E. Kasowitz Provides Details of What He Termed a 'Simple, But
Frighteningly Destructive Scheme' to Manipulate the Stock Market in Testimony Before
the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, PR NEWSWIRE, June 28, 2006; see also Phyllis
Feinberg, Hedge Fund Collusion?, MAR/HEDGE, Sept. 11, 2006, at 3.
202 See Paul S. Atkins, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the Corporate
Director Forum 2007 (Jan. 22, 2007), available at http:l/www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007
/spch012207psa.htm.
. 203 Emptied voting is when the voting rights are separated or emptied from the
accompanying economic ownership. Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61 Bus. L.
1011, 1014 (2006) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Empty Voting]; see Kara Scannell, Outside
Influence: How Borrowed Shares Swing Company Votes; SEC and Others Fear Hedge-
Fund Strategy May Subvert Elections, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2007, at Al; see also Henry
T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 820 (2006) [hereinafter Hu & Black,
The New Vote Buying].
204 Vote morphing is renting shares from other in vestors immediately before a
shareholder vote, so that investors can plausibly deny the economic ownership that
triggers disclosure requirements. Hu & Black, Empty Voting, supra note 203, at 1014.
205 Id.
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factors that arise easily in the hedge fund industry.206  Although
hedge funds are subject to basic antifraud requirements in the
Securities Exchange Act, 207 the Act failed to prevent fraud in the
over ninety cases that the SEC has brought against hedge fund
advisers since 2001.208 Fraud is believed to be involved in over
half of all hedge fund closures. 20 9 Common types of fraud haveincluded misappropriation of assets,210  misrepresentation of
206 The usual incentive for hedge fund fraud is greed related to the large potential
compensation available to hedge fund managers. An unregulated hedge fund manager
may have an easy opportunity to engage in fraud, particularly if he possesses a strong
concentration of powers over funds. This is especially true if lack of appropriate internal
controls and the complexity of the transactions make it easy to hide the fraud. A hedge
fund manager may rationalize his fraud by maintaining that all will work out in the long
run. See Greg N. Gregoriou & William Kelting, The Billion-Dollar Hedge Fund Fraud,
12 J. OF FIN. CRIME 172, 173 (2004).
207 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
208 Nightly Business Report: The SEC Turns to Capitol Hill For Hedge Fund Help
(PBS television broadcast Jul. 25, 2006) (statement of Christopher Cox). But cf Sants
Won't Go Marching In, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 2006, at 14 (discussing the first
fine imposed on the U.K.'s hedge fund industry).
209 See MARK JICKLING & ALISON A. RAAB, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: HEDGE
FUND FAILURES 4 (Congressional Research Service 2007) (citing Corentin Christory et
al., Quantification of Hedge Fund Default Risk, J. Alternative Investments, Fall 2006, at
71, 76), available at http://www.abiworld.org/pdfs/June2007HedgeFundFailures.pdf.
However, another study suggests that half of all hedge fund failures are attributable to
operational risk. DELOITTrE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, PRECAUTIONS THAT PAY OFF: RISK
MANAGEMENT AND VALUATION PRACTICES IN THE GLOBAL HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY 10
(2006) (citing Stuart Feffer & Christopher Kundro, Understanding and Mitigating
Operational Risk in Hedge Fund Investments § 3.1 (Mar. 2003), available at
http://www.capco.com/assets/DFA90A4A-E6DD-4F62-9466-ACD 1A05A25FF.pdf),
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us-fsiHedgeFundsRiskMgmt-Jan07%20%
282%29.pdf. This risk includes "misrepresentation of fund investments,
misappropriation of investor funds, unauthorized trading, and inadequate resources."
STUART FEFFER & CHRISTOPHER KUNDRO, UNDERSTANDING AND MITIGATING
OPERATIONAL RISK IN HEDGE FUND INVESTMENTS § 3.2 (Capital Markets Co. Ltd. 2003),
available at http://www.capco.com/assets/DFA90A4A-E6DD-4F62-9466-
ACD I A05A25FF.pdf; see also Stuart Feffer & Christopher Kundro, Understanding and
Mitigating Operational Risk in Hedge Fund Investments, 10 J. OF FIN. TRANSFORMATION
41, 42-44 (2004), available at http://www.capco.com/WorkArea/
showcontent.aspx?id=1712.
210 SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 73. For smaller hedge fund frauds, it is
more common to have outright diversion of assets; for larger frauds, failed trading
strategies are more common. See Guarding Against Hedge Fund Fraud, TRUSTING, Mar.
2005, at 27.
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211portfolio performance, falsification of credentials or
reporting,212 improper valuation of assets,2 13 and other fraud
arising from various conflicts of interest.
214
"Private investment in public equity" (PIPE) transactions
comprise another common type of fraudulent transaction involving
hedge funds. 2 15 In a PIPE, a company sells unregistered stock at a
discount because the stock is illiquid. Then, the investor hedges
its PIPE purchase by shorting the public stock.2 17  Using the
218
unregistered stock as a cover for the short sale is illegal.. In a
PIPE, the effect is as if additional registered stock existed, when it
did not.2 19
An opportunity for fraud arises from various conflicts of
interest that exist for hedge fund advisers. For example, some
hedge fund advisers oversee more than one fund, trading other
types of financial investments like mutual funds. This "side by
side" management enabled some advisers to favor hedge funds in220
order to provide the adviser more lucrative compensation. This
preferential treatment is at the expense of other clients, such as
mutual fund shareholders. 22 1 Widespread hedge fund involvement
211 SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 73. See generally Maha Khan Phillips,
How to Commit Hedge Fraud, GLOBAL INVESTOR, Oct. 2004, at 31. Principal categories
of securities law violations for hedge fund investments are antifraud violations, reporting
violations, and record keeping/internal control violations. See also Mary Ann Gadziala,
Associate Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Address at the
International Bar Association Conference, Financial Services Section: Structured
Finance Activities: The Regulatory Viewpoint (Sept 20, 2006).
212 SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 73.
213 Id.
214 Other reasons for fraud may include misleading disclosures or "pump and dump"
schemes, through which untrue or misleading information about a company is
disseminated. See id. at 74; see also GUIZOT, supra note 151, at 261.
215 See Kara Scannell, Three New York Hedge Funds Settle Charges Tied to
Trading, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2006, at C4.
216 id.
217 id.
218 id.
219 For various examples of PIPES, see GUIzoT, supra note 151, at 260.
220 See Fin. Services Auth., supra note 50, at 62.
221 See id.
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in "late trading" '222  and inappropriate "market timing"223
throughout the industry224 was discovered in 2004.225  Hedge
funds that had special deals with selected investors cost ordinary
stock investors millions of dollars.226
Various other potential conflicts of interest arise in hedge
222 "Late trading" is illegal. It involves profiting from market events occurring after
the stock market closes at 4:00 P.M. Eastern time. The trader benefits from updated
market information while taking advantage of the market's outdated closing price. See
Kip Betz, N.Y. AG Launches Probe of Fraud Industry: Hedge Fund Pays $40M to
Resolve Claims, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA), Sept. 4, 2003; Randall Smith & Tom Lauricella,
Law Firms Advised on Rules Governing Funds Late Trading, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2003,
at Cl.
223 "Market timing" involves the "rapid fire" purchase of mutual fund shares to take
advantage of the fund's share price from the prior day's valuation of the underlying
assets. Review of Current Investigations and Regulatory Actions Regarding the Mutual
Fund Industry: Hearing on Investigations and Regulatory Actions Regarding the Mutual
Fund Industry and Investors' Protection Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing &
Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004) 541-43 (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller
Gen., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office). Market timing attempts to skim the profits from
other investors. Id. For several years, the SEC failed to uncover market timing abuses in
mutual funds, costing shareholders about $5 billion. See SEC Missed Mutual Fund
Abuses, CONSUMER AFFAIRS, Apr. 2005.
224 The mutual fund scandal was estimated to cost long-term investors an additional
$400 million per year. Kim Clark, Mutual Mess: The Fund Scandal Grows and Grows,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 17, 2003, at 43. According to Morningstar, as many as
forty hedge funds were implicated in the mutual fund scandal. Amey Stone, Hedge
Funds Are Everyone's Problem, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Aug. 6, 2004. At least
nineteen brokerage firms have entered into a settlement with the SEC regarding this
activity. See Harry S. Davis & Sahar Shirazi, Funds and Misdemeanours - And How To
Avoid Each When Investing in Hedge Funds, HEDGE FUNDS REVIEW, Oct. 2006, at 27,
30, 35 n.12., available at http:l/www.srz.comlfiles/October%202006%20-
%20HedgeArticle.pdf.
225 For example, in August 2006, Prudential entered into a $275 million settlement
over its market timing practices. See SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, 2006 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 10 (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar
/secpar2006.pdf. This settlement occurred after the SEC alleged that four Prudential
brokers defrauded more than twenty-five mutual funds of more than $2.5 billion. See
Ellen Rosen, Savoring a Small Victory After a Market Timing Scandal, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2006, at C6.
226 Steven B. Boehm & Cynthia A. Reed, Shedding Light on Hedge Funds: The SEC
Rethinks the Lack of Regulation, BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 2004, at 53. Prudential
brokers generated more than $162 million for their hedge fund clients through improper
market timing practices. Walter Hamilton, Prudential Admits Improper Trading, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2006, at Cl. The $162 million in profit generated earned the brokers
involved nearly $50 million in commissions. Id. While the mutual funds tried to block
the trading, the brokers took countermeasures to evade the monitors. Id.
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funds. Insider trading 227 by hedge fund employees is becoming• • 228
an increasing concern. A hedge fund may secretly line the
adviser's pockets by inappropriately charging billions of dollars'
worth of expenses to investors. 229 Similarly, a fund might buy a
stock near the end of a quarter or year to drive up its price in order
to show a more favorable fund performance and collect higher
performance fees. 23  The reliability of hedge fund asset valuations
is always a concern, especially because there are no standards for
hedge fund valuations. 23 1  Also, a lack of uniformity in the
227 "Insider trading is illegal when a person trades a security while in possession of
material non-public information in violation of a duty to withhold the information or
refrain from trading." Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Law That Governs the Securities
Industry, http:www.sec.gov/aboutlaws.shtml (last visited Sept. 15, 2007). In fiscal year
2006, twenty percent of all SEC investigations involved insider trading. SEC Chairman
Cox stated that one reason for the increase in insider trading investigations was the
incidence of suspicious transactions occurring prior to takeovers, transactions that were
prompted by hedge funds and private equity funds. Stephen Taub, SEC Probing Private
Equity, Hedge Funds, CFO.coM, Oct. 19, 2006,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/8069819?f=search; see also Kara Scannell & Randall
Smith, SEC Boosts Probe for Wall Street Leaks; Mutual-Fund Complaints Help Prompt
Call for Data in Insider Investigation, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2007, at C15. For an
example of a hedge fund manager being sentenced for insider trading, see Press Release,
Michael J. Sullivan, U.S. Att'y, Dist. of Mass., Hedge Fund Manager Sentenced for
Insider Trading (Nov. 29, 2006), http://boston.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel06/
insidertrading112906.pdf. Hedge fund manager Michael K. C. Tom was sentenced to
three years of probation for insider trading that occurred when he traded Citizens Bank
common stock and options based on an insider tip concerning Citizens Bank's
impending merger with Charter One Financial. Id.
228 For discussion of insider trading as it relates to hedge funds, see Examining
Enforcement of Criminal Insider Trading and Hedge Fund Activity: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1277 (2006) (statement of Linda C. Thomsen,
Director of Enforcement, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
229 For example, a Toronto-based hedge fund management company was accused by
Italian prosecutors of illegally diverting more than $87 million in commissions, referral
fees, and other expenses. See Michael Jivkov, Small Talk: Langbar Founder Is
Interviewed as Part of Investigation Into Hedge Fund Collapse, THE INDEP., Dec. 19,
2005, at 54.
230 See Whitney Tilson, Funds Dirty Little Secrets, THE MOTLEY FOOL, Apr. 16,
2004, http://www.fool.conminvesting/general/2004/04/16/funds-dirty-little-secrets.aspx.
Academics are trying to determine why hedge funds almost always perform better in
December than any other month and why performance is often negative in January. See
Floyd Norris, How Real Are Results from Hedge Funds? INT'L HERALD TRm., Apr. 21,
2006, at 16.
231 SEC Hedge Fund Adviser Rule, supra note 40, at 72,062-63; Mohamed Gaber et
al., Funds of Hedge Funds: Ethics of This Black Box Strategy, 9 PENSIONS: AN INT'L J.
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valuation of complex assets exist,232 and an estimated one-third of
hedge fund managers do not even disclose their valuation
procedures to all of their investors.233
Outside service providers to hedge funds sometimes engage in
activities involving conflicts of interest that violate their fiduciary
responsibilities. For example, pension fund consultants 2 34 are
sometimes offered higher fees for promoting hedge fund advisers
who receive fees from FOFs.235  Can outside service providers,
such as investment banks,2 36 really remain independent when they
328, 331 (2004). Spain adopted new rules to preserve the independence and reliability of
the net asset valuation calculation. See Hedge Funds in Spain, SIMMONS & SIMMONS,
May 17, 2006, at 4.
232 DELOITTE, supra note 209, at 15.
233 Id. at 12.
234 Pension fund trustees often rely on external consultants for the fund's asset
allocation and on reliable external fund mangers. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES 118 (Int'l Monetary
Fund 2004), available at http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/
2004/01/index.htm (follow "Institutional Investors in Emerging Markets" hyperlink).
235 Because advising pension fund trustees on asset allocations is not a regulated
activity, government rules on managing conflicts of interest do not apply. "The FSA
propose[d] to open a dialogue with the Pensions Regulator to discuss appropriate risk
management strategies and to keep a close eye on fund managers to ensure that they
comply with the conflict of interest rules." Norton Rose, Hedge Funds: The Future of
UK Regulation 3 (Sept. 2005) (on file with author). A similar concern exists in the
United States, as illustrated by the Consulting Services Group (CSG), which helped to
promote the Bayou Management hedge fund before it defrauded investors of more than
$450 million by overstating financial results and forging audited financial statements.
Yamil Berard, City Invested in Failed Hedge Fund, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr.
24, 2006. Because CSG had received fees from Bayou's money managers, serious
questions exist as to whether CSG's inept recommendation to invest in the hedge fund
was influenced by financial incentives that hedge fund managers indirectly provided.
Id.; see also STAFF OF SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTIONS,
REPORT CONCERNING EXAMINATION OF SELECT PENSION CONSULTANTS (2005), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/pensionexamstudy.pdf; Lori Richards, Director, Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n, Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, Remarks at the
14th Annual Public Fund Boards Forum: Conflicts of Interest in Pension Consulting: An
Update on the SEC's Examinations (Dec. 5, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch 1205051r.htm.
236 Banks have direct exposure to hedge fund losses. "Banks also face indirect
exposures ... [to losses from] hedge fund counterparties and the impact of hedge fund
activities in financial markets on their proprietary trading portfolios." EUROPEAN
CENTRAL BANK, LARGE EU BANKS' EXPOSURES TO HEDGE FUNDS 8 (European Central
Bank 2005), available at www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/
largeeubanksexposureshedgefunds20051 len.pdf.
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greatly benefit from the substantial business that hedge funds
provide? 237  Another concern is the questionable quality of the
offshore administration industry supporting hedge funds. 23' Thus,
addressing hedge fund fraud and conflicts of opportunity will
require a coordinated international approach.239
Tax fraud frequently accompanies accounting fraud.
240
Examples of tax fraud by hedge funds include the cases of Long
Term Capital Management 24 1 and Quellos, one of the largest
sellers of funds-of-funds (FOFs).242 Quellos helped to shield $2
billion in taxes by fabricating billions of dollars of fake securities
transactions to generate fake capital losses.243  Even legal tax
avoidance by tax-exempt organizations in the U.S. that invest in
237 A recent lawsuit alleges that a powerful hedge fund group conspired to create
false reports about the financial health of a company by ghostwriting negative reports.
Jane Sasseen et al., The Secret Lives of Short-Sellers; The Rise of Hedge Funds and Indie
Research Raises New Questions About a Shadowy World, Bus. WK., Apr. 10, 2006, at
50.
238 Valuation models used by administrators are often not independently derived.
Instead, these models are sometimes developed by the fund managers with expertise in
over-the-counter or illiquid investments markets. See Norton Rose, supra note 235. In
such cases, the fund administrator does not effectively act as an independent third party.
The lack of real independence is a common problem when management has the ability to
fire the independent service provider.
239 Sometimes hedge fund fraud in one country gets ignored in another country. For
example, a hedge fund manager who was fined by UK's financial regulator for market
abuse soon reinvented himself in Switzerland and found financial backers. See Back in
Business; Hedge Funds, ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 2006, at 81.
240 U.K. tax authorities sought to reclaim $1.9 billion from the hedge fund industry
based in London. Neil Behrmann, UK Tax Authorities Launch Major Investigation Into
Hedge Funds, INFOVEST21 NEWS, May 22, 2006. The U.K. tax authorities alleged that
hedge funds have paid inadequate taxes on fees earned from their offshore funds. Anita
Raghavan, British Tax Police Look Hard at Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006,
at Cl. Some hedge fund firms were sloppy in handling their tax obligations and others
were engaged in questionable tax avoidance schemes. Behrmann, supra; see also
Raghavan, supra.
241 Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn.
2004); see also David Cay Johnston, A Tax Shelter, Deconstructed, N.Y. TIMES, July 13,
2003, at Cl (discussing the Long Term Capital Management case).
242 See Drew DeSilver, Probe Into Tax-Haven Abuses Names Seattle-Based
Quellos; Senate Investigation into Offshore Shelters - Report Alleges Investment Firm
Used Fake Deals to Help Client Shield $2 Billion from Taxes, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 2,
2006, at C 1.
243 See id.; Lynnley Browning, Tax Shelters Under Scrutiny at Seattle Hedge Fund
Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at C3.
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offshore hedge funds and tax treatment of carried interest by hedge
fund managers should draw Congressional attention for change.
Those who try to avoid having to pay U.S. taxes on unrelated
business income or who benefit from capital gain treatment on
their compensation deprive the public by not paying their fair
share of taxes.
245
C. Potential Losses Amplified Through Inadequate Risk
Management
Potential losses from hedge fund fraud, whether related to
accounting or tax fraud, are often amplified through weak risk
management practices. The ordinary investing public may feel the
market effects of hedge fund losses arising from leveraged and
speculative transactions. The potential pain is especially great
since many pension plans are investors in hedge funds.
246Uninformed investors are also at risk, especially as stiffer
competition places pressure on hedge fund managers to take even
, 247
larger risks with the investors' money. When hedge fund fraud
occurs, 248 investors almost never recoup all the losses from the
fraud.249 Potential losses for ordinary investors arise not only
244 Tax-exempt organizations received some scrutiny and reform in the Pension
Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006); see also The
Taxation of Carried Interest. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong.
(2007) (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Cong. Budget Office) available at
http://www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/testimony/2007test/071107testpo.pdf.
245 See Arden Dale, Outside Audit: Hedge Fund Tax Break Raises Flags; Come
April 15, the Difference Between 'Trader,' 'Investor,' Can Be a Substantial Sum, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 26, 2006, at C3.
246 Risks include the manner by which hedge funds value their hedge fund assets,
lack of independent review over hedge fund accounting, incentives that may cause an
adviser to inaccurately value hedge funds, and lack of access to information to acquire
fair value for their interests. See Swiss NAT'L BANK, MONETARY POLICY REPORT:
QUARTERLY BULLETIN 43 (2005), http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/
quartbul_2005_l1gp/source/quartbul_2005_lgp.en.pdf.
247 Amy Borrus, A Guide to Hedge-Fund Maze, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Oct. 19, 2005.
248 In 2003, the SEC staff found no evidence that fraud is more prevalent among
hedge fund advisers than mutual fund advisers. See SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note
11, at 73. However, hedge fund fraud is on the rise and even more cases are expected in
the future, according to the SEC Enforcement Director, Linda Thomsen. See Phyllis
Diamond, Thomsen Defends Corporate Penalties, Expects to See More Hedge Fund
Cases, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA), Nov. 9, 2005.
249 Hedge Funds: The New Money Men, ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 2005, at 13-14.
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from the "retailization" of hedge funds, but also from the riskiness
of the investment, the potential for inadequate management
practices, and other internal control problems.
In addition to the dramatic growth of hedge fund assets and the
increased concern over hedge fund fraud, any future-regulation of
hedge funds must consider the "retailization" of hedge funds.
Retailization is the increased sale of hedge funds to ordinary
investors either directly or indirectly. 251 Direct sales are facilitated
by the lower minimum investments required when investing in a
fund of funds. Also, hedge funds started to go public in 2006,252
although FOFs have previously been listed in Europe. 253 Indirect
sale of hedge funds occurs through purchases by pension funds,
university endowments, and charitable organizations - all of
which are entities upon which the general public relies.254 Indirect
sale also occurs through mutual funds that attempt to imitate hedge
250 In reality, a little regulation, of hedge funds exists. Regulation includes
restrictions on offerings to the public, advertising prohibitions, selected compliance
requirements, antifraud provisions, and insider trading restrictions. See Managed Funds
Assoc., HF & HF Adviser FAQs, http://www.managedfunds.org/hf-hf-adviser-faqs.asp
(follow "How are hedge funds regulated?" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
251 For a summary of the availability of hedge funds for purchase by individual
investors in various countries, see PRICEWATERHOUSEqOOPERS, THE, REGULATION,
TAXATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF HEDGE FUNDS IN EUROPE: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES
37-38 (4th ed. ' 2006), http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/
docid/44343824ED0025ED85256EA80052D97A (follow "June 2006" hyperlink).
252 European FOFs went public first. See Mara Der Hovanesian, A Peek Into The
Hedges, Bus. WK., Dec. 11, 2006, at 13. U.S. FOFs followed. See Lynn Cowan, IPO
Outlook - Alternative Investment Twist: Fortress Plans a Stock Listing, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 20, 2006, at C5. In the U.S., the trading price of FOF Fortress rose an astonishing
seventy percent during in its first trading day. See Eleanor Laise, Hedge Funds Beckon
Small Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2007, at DI. However, the stock price of the FOF
fell twenty percent from that high point later in the first week. See Steve Gelsi, Fortress
Investment Group Sheds Gains, MARKETWATCH, Feb. 16, 2007,
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/fortress-invesment-groups-share-
price/story.aspx?guid=%7BF47FE 139%2DE5EA%2D44CA%2DADD I%2DE8B5134E
AC32%7D.
253 FOFs were listed primarily on the Irish and Luxembourg Stock Exchanges. See
VON COTrIER, supra note 6, at 67.
254 Countries are concerned whether retail investors understand hedge fund
activities and the risk profiles of hedge funds. Fin. Services Auth., Hedge Funds and the
FSA 6.11 (Fin. Services Auth., Discussion Paper No. 16, 2002),
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp I 6.pdf.
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255fund investing strategies. Retailization has occurred despite
SEC Chairman Cox's 2006 warning that hedge funds were too
risky for 'Mom and Pop' investors.
25
Substantial investment risks2 57 are created by the manner in
which hedge fund assets are invested, adding to the risks that exist
in all highly leveraged instruments.258  Hedge funds pose greater
liquidity risks than other instruments because they often operate in
markets that can suddenly become illiquid.259  "Mark-to-
market"' 6 risk reflects the challenge of "valu[ing] some illiquid
positions at market prices [when] there is no efficient market for
[the financial product]." 26' Size risk reflects the idea that
strategies that work in smaller environments might not work as
well with larger financial positions.
262
Other risks posed by hedge fund investments include business
risk, industry sector risk, and portfolio construction risk.263  Some
risks are easy to statistically estimate,264 while others are difficult
to estimate. Hedge fund complexities necessitate the use of risk
management techniques by investors and creditors of hedge
255 In 2006, mutual funds attempting to imitate hedge funds grew exponentially.
See Eleanor Laise & lanthe Jeanne Dugan, The Private-Money World Opens Up, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 18, 2006, at R 1.
256 Posting of Aaron C. Buser to New Jersey Law Blog, SEC Chairman Wants More
Hedge Fund Regulation, http://www.njlawblog.com/securities-compliance-arbitration-
sec-chairman-wants-more-hedge-fund-regulation.html (Aug. 10, 2006).
257 See Amy Friedman, Hedge Funds: Still Risky Business, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Oct.
17, 2006.
258 Phyllis J. Bernstein, The Hedge Fund Mystique: Making Money With an
Investment that Goes Against the Flow, J. OF ACCT., May 2002, at 55.
259 PHILIPS, supra note 83, at 6.
260 "Mark-to-market" refers to recording the value of a security or account as its fair
market value (as opposed to its book value) to calculate potential profits or losses.
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.comlterms/mlmarktomarket.asp (last visited
Sept. 16, 2007).
261 Bernstein, supra note 258, at 57.
2 62 Id. at 58.
263 Pinnavaia, supra note 87, at 9.
264 Risks that are relatively easy to determine statistically include equity market,
interest rate, credit, volatility, and liquidity risks. Id. at 10.
265 Risks that are difficult to determine include business risk, manager investment
risk, and event risk. Id at 10.
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266funds. These techniques include due diligence in the inspection
of the hedge fund investment,2 67 areements to require private
disclosure of financial information, 26 practices to obtain sufficient
collateral for loans,269 credit lending limits on hedge funds,27 ° and
regular monitoring of the hedge fund's activities. 27  A study by a
private industry group notes that fund management demands for
new investment strategies are growing more rapidly than risk
management capabilities of many institutional investors.
272
Effective risk management requires a culture of sound
corporate governance and decision-making, 273 so that the fund
manager understands the level of risk and takes action to control
274that risk. Yet, a survey of hedge fund advisers suggests that
266 See Harry M. Kat, How to Evaluate a New Diversifier with 10 Simple Questions,
J. OF WEALTH MGMT., Spring 2007, at 29.
267 Due diligence reviews for institutional investors normally take between two to
six months to complete. SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 59 n.206. Due
diligence is a "huge issue," even for experienced financial analysts. Lawrence C. Strauss
& Jack Willoughby, Hedge-Fund Roundtable: Finding the Razor's Edge, BARRON'S,
Nov. 27, 2006, at 39, 45. See generally Ken Stem, Hedge Fund Due Diligence for Retail
Advisors and Brokers, INVESTMENT PLANNING, Feb. 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.cpfg.com/CALUArticle.pdf.
268 Private disclosure may include financial statements. However, the typical
financial statement on hedge funds does not provide informlition about the risk profile of
the trading activity. WORKING GROUP REPORT I, supra note 46, at 6.
269 Collateral practices require collateral from hedge funds as a risk mitigation
device. The president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York recently asked
regulators to determine whether banks and securities dealers are requiring hedge funds to
provide sufficient collateral, known as a margin requirement. See Phil Izzo, Economists
See Hedge-Fund Risks; Survey Indicates Concerns About a Lack of Oversight, Use of
Borrowed Money, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2006, at C3.
270 Credit limits provide a common credit risk management tool that applies at
various levels of relative returns and risks. Credit risk is probably the most important
variable in determining whether financial disturbances become financial shocks posing
systemic risk. See CRM POLICY GROUP II, supra note 6, at 7.
271 Monitoring of credit exposures usually includes on-going financial reporting
requirements, as well as daily mark-to-market valuation of assets and potential liabilities.
272 See CRM POLICY GROUP II, supra note 6, at D-4.
273 See Corrigan, supra note 38, at 102.
274 See generally GUIZOT, supra note 151, at 105. "Even the seemingly mundane -
but critically important - back-office operations of all classes of financial institutions are
now enormously complex and entail sizeable elements of financial, operational and
reputational risk." CRM POLICY GROUP II, supra note 6, at 10.
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current risk management practices are often deficient.275 One
investigator explains that hedge funds generally perform risk
management only on the surface as a marketing tool, rather than
for true risk management purposes.
276
Lack of integrity by a hedge fund manager substantially
increases risk of loss. For example, in 2007, a court ordered major
brokerage firm Bears Stearns to pay $125 million because the firm
waited a year before scrutinizing the false books and records of a
277hedge fund. This delay increased Bear Steams' own collection
of fees, while the losses to the hedge fund customers rose.278 The
same year as the court decision, two major funds operated by Bear^ • . 279Stearns collapsed, generating massive losses for investors.
IV. SEC's Historic Lack of Oversight on Hedge Funds
Hedge funds generally seek to avoid government regulation. 280
Without restrictions from government regulation, hedge funds can
better preserve any proprietary information about their trading
activities.281  Part V.a. discusses how securities regulation is
generally avoided through exemptions under the U.S. securities
laws. Part V.b. reviews the SEC's regulatory reinterpretation of a
"client" in an attempt to force more hedge funds to register with
the SEC. Part V.c. explains how the D.C. Circuit Court of
275 DELOITrE, supra note 209, at 10. For example, about half the hedge fund
advisors do not monitor off-balance-sheet leverage. Id. at 9. Few have conducted
"stress tests" to determine how they will react when unexpected market events occur. Id.
at 6.
276 GuIZOT, supra note 151, at 105.
277 See Otis Bilodeau & Thom Weidlich, Bear Steams Ordered to Pay $125 Million,
WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2007, at D03.
278 Id.
279 See Kate Kelly et al., Wall Street, Bear Steams Hit Again By Investors Fleeing
Mortgage Sector, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2007, at Al.
280 See John Poirier, House Democrats Introduce Hedge Fund Bill, REUTERS, June
9, 2006 (statement of Bruce McGuire, President, Conn. Hedge Fund Assoc.), available
at http://www.redorbit.com/news/politics/555333/house-democratsintroduce
_hedge-fundbill/index.html.
281 "Hedge fund and mutual fund managers of portfolios of more than $100 million
of public securities must file 13F forms with the Securities and Exchange Commission"
on their largest stock holdings. Gregory Zuckerman, A Peek at Moneymakers' Cards,
Hedge Fund Filings on Holdings Can Clue Investors In on Strategy; Taking Joys on Bets
Gone Awry, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2006, at C1.
[Vol. XXXI
REGULATING HEDGE FUNDS
Appeals rejected the SEC's reinterpretation and the subsequent
Congressional inaction. Following the 2007 District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Congress and the SEC engaged
in only a limited effort to regulate hedge funds. The resulting
regulations are insufficient to correct the current lack of proper
government oversight of hedge funds, a major participant in the
financial markets.
A. Avoidance of U.S. Securities Laws through Exemptions
After the stock market crash of 1929, Congress created two
major laws regulating the securities industry: the Securities Act of
2821933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. After the "Great
Depression" of the 1930s, Congress added two more major
securities laws in 1940: The Investment Company Act and the
Investment Advisers Act.283  After the corporate failures of the
early 2000s, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).284
President Bush characterized SOX as the most far-reaching reform
of American business practices since the securities laws of the
1930s.285  Although SOX set a tone for a tougher enforcement
environment for business entities, exemptions in the securities
laws have still enabled many hedge funds to escape even light
regulation that is needed for proper government oversight. 286
The Securities Act of 1933 was designed to force truth in
securities through SEC registration upon the issuance of corporate
securities. As a consequence, investors had to receive financial
information concerning the securities. The law also prohibited
deceit, misrepresentation, and other fraud in the sale of
287 288securities. However, a private placement exemption exempts
282 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000).
28 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2000); Investment Advisers Act, 15
U.S.C. § 80b (2000).
284 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
285 See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Law, supra note 227, at 5.
286 This exemption of hedge funds from the heightened enforcement environment
has occurred despite the concept that the SEC oversees other key participants in the
financial markets, such as the stock exchanges, broker-dealers, and mutual funds.
287 See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Law, supra note 227, at 5.
288 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000) (commonly known as the authority for the Regulation
D exemption for private offerings). Hedge funds using the private placement exception
2007]
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hedge funds' issuers when they are engaging in non-public
,,289
offerings which are sold to "accredited investors. Accredited
investors are generally defined as either having net assets
exceeding $1 million or at least $200,000 in annual income.290
This rule assumes that those investors meeting these monetary
requirements, be it wealthy individuals or qualified institutional
buyers, are sophisticated investors who are capable of
understanding the risks and who have the ability to withstand
potential significant losses from the investment.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was designed to curb
speculation and market manipulation by regulating the resale of
securities.291 If a hedge fund qualifies as a "dealer," so as to be
engaged in the business of "buying and selling securities for one's
own account, ' '292 it must register under the 1934 Act. 293  "Non-
Dealer" status under the trader exception of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 is important for hedge funds.
294
The Investment Company Act of 1940 was designed to
may not engage in general solicitation or advertising. See generally SEC STAFF, 2003
REP., supra note 11, at 16-17.
289 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (2000). See, e.g., Regulation D's Rule 506 exemption for the
issuance of securities sold to accredited investors, which permits only thirty-five non-
accredited investors. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007). Regulation D is the most frequently
used exemption. ROBERT H. ROSENBLUM, INVESTMENT COMPANY DETERMINATION
UNDER THE 1940 ACT: EXEMPTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 861 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2003).
290 "Accredited investors" meet the income test if their income was more than
$200,000 (or $300,000 for a married couple), in each of the last two years. 17 C.F.R. §
230.501(a) (2007). Accredited investors are distinguishable from "non-accredited
investors" and "super accredited investors." Non-accredited investors have less income
or assets than those required to qualify as "accredited investors," while "super accredited
investors" have $5 million or more in assets for individuals and $25 million or more for
entities.
291 See Elizabeth Killer and Gregory A. Gehlman, Comment, A Historical
Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 348 (1988).
292 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (2000).
293 There is an exception, however, for persons who buy or sell securities for their
own account. Id. § 78c(a)(5)(B).
294 A "trader" is an entity that trades solely for its own investment account and does
not carry on a public securities business. See SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at
18. Given the enormous profitability and business realities of hedge funds, the common
assumption that this exception applies to hedge funds deserves further scrutiny by the
SEC. Id.
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increase disclosure and includes specific protections against self-
dealing, conflicts of interest, misappropriations of funds, and
overreaching of fees or expenses. 29 5  The protection of investors
was needed from the abusive practices of investment companies,
such as those that arise from conflicts of interest. Hedge funds
often escaped application of the Investment Company Act through
one of two exceptions to the definition of an investment company
when no public offering is made:296 the section 3(c)(1) "Qualified
Purchaser" exemption 29 7 and the section 3(c)(7) "maximum 100
298persons with substantial net worth" exemption.
The Investment Adviser's Act was designed to reduce the
abusive practices of unregulated investment advisers that Congress
believed contributed to the stock market crash of 1929 and the
299resulting Great Depression of the 1930s. The Adviser's Act is
principally a reporting, disclosure, and antifraud statute. 300 It
replaced the previous government philosophy of buyer beware.
30 1
The SEC created several rules governing the implementation of
295 Id. at 127.
296 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2000).
297 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7). Qualified purchasers are individuals who have assets of
at least $5 million or, if acting for another, a qualified purchaser must have assets of at
least $25 million to be recognized as an "Investment Company." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(51) (2000). The qualified purchaser exemption was added in the National Securities
Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996).
298 The second exemption excludes securities beneficially owned by not more than
one hundred persons, each having substantial net worth (a lower amount than required to
qualify as a "qualified purchaser"). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2000). A "look through"
provision exists in this exemption for certain entities that own ten percent of an issuer's
stock. Id.
299 Richard S. Cortese, Overview of the Adviser's Act, in LIPPER HEDGEWORLD
ANNUAL GUIDE 113 (2005); see Investor Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. (2000).
Similarly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed to address the type of fraud which led to
the Enron and WorldCom scandals. Annette L. Nazareth, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Remarks at the ALI-ABA Sarbanes-Oxley Institute (Oct. 12, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch101206aln.htm.
300 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2000) (prohibiting the overstatement of assets under an
adviser's management, the receipt of commission kickbacks, engagement in "cherry
picking" schemes, dissemination of materially false and misleading advertising, and
other misconduct).
301 The Advisers Act has registered more than 8,500 advisory firms which
collectively manage over $23 trillion in assets, some of which are hedge fund advisers.
SEC Hedge Fund Adviser Rule, supra note 40, at 72,060.
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the Adviser's Act in an effort to ensure receipt of accurate
financial information from advisers. 302  These rules require
advisers to maintain books and records, 30 3 establish internal
controls for proper custody,304  and establish policies and
procedures to promote compliance, 305 among other rules. 30 6
Hedge fund advisers must generally register with the SEC
under the Advisers Act, assuming thea7 meet the minimum of $25
million in assets under management. However, two significant
302 See Terrance J. O'Malley, An Overview of Advisers Act Requirements for Hedge
Fund Managers, 5 J. OF INV. COMPLIANCE 50 (2004).
303 A "Books and Records Rule," requires registered investment advisers to
maintain the books and records related to their advisory business. The records must
include all accounts, internal working papers, and any documents supporting claims
made about an adviser's performance, and must be maintained for a five-year period
after the performance information is last used. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (2007). Hedge
fund advisers would have benefited from a grandfather clause which provided them with
a phase-in of the books and records rule. SEC Hedge Fund Adviser Rule, supra note 40,
at 72,075. The Books and Records Rule for a registered hedge fund adviser
encompasses the records of private funds for which the adviser acts as an investment
adviser. Id. at 72,076.
304 A "Custody Rule," requires an adviser to maintain internal controls designed to
protect client assets from being lost, misused, or misappropriated. 17 C.F.R. §
275.206(4)-2 (2007). Hedge fund advisers may satisfy custody account information
delivery obligations by distributing audited financial statement to investors within 180
days of fiscal year-end. SEC Hedge Fund Adviser Rule, supra note 40 at 72,076.
305 The "Compliance Rule," requires hedge funds to designate a "Chief Compliance
Officer" (CCO). 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7 (2007). The CCO maintains comprehensive
internal policies and procedures to promote the investment adviser's compliance with
SEC law. Id. Thus, for hedge funds, the CCO would need to adopt various policies and
processes regarding portfolio management, trading practices, valuations, and
recordkeeping. The CCO would also help to maintain the accuracy of disclosures,
safeguarding of client assets, privacy protections of client records, and business
continuity plans. See generally Stuart Cohen, Executive Director, Ernst & Young, SEC
Adopts Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers, Global Hedge Funds Accounting &
Regulatory Alert 1, 3-4 (Dec. 2004).
306 Additional SEC rules include the "Code of Ethics," the "Proxy Voting Rule,"
and the "Disciplinary Disclosure" rules. By adopting a Code of Ethics, a hedge fund
adviser gains rules of conduct for addressing potential conflicts of interest and
procedures for personal securities transactions. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1 (2007). The
Proxy Voting Rule ensures that the adviser votes in the best interest of the client. 17
C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2007). The Disciplinary Disclosure Rule applies when clients or
potential clients are selecting an investment adviser. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-4 (2007).
307 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (2000) (defining "investment adviser"). In determining
the amount of assets under a hedge fund adviser's management, the adviser must include
the total value of securities portfolios in the assets under management. Id. § 80b-3a
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loopholes allow some hedge funds to avoid the SEC
Registration. 30 8 One loophole results from extending the lock-up
period for withdrawal from the investment for at least two years.
The other loophole is the "Private Adviser Exemption." 30 9 This
exemption from registration is for investment advisers who have
less than fifteen clients during the preceding twelve months. The
Private Adviser Exemption was intended for small advisers whose
activities were not national in scope and who provided advice to
family members and friends. 310  This limited exemption was not
intended to exempt advisers who serve only wealthy or
sophisticated investors.311 These wealthy or sophisticated
investors often include institutional investors, such as pension
funds, that serve a large number of individuals, individuals who
rely on government oversight to protect their investment. Thus,
using the number of clients as the only criterion for exemption
creates a loophole that could leave many individuals without
protection.
B. The SEC's Attempted Regulation of Hedge Fund Advisers
In 2004, the SEC voted to tighten eligibility under the Private
Adviser's Exemption through new "Hedge Fund Advisers
Rules. ' 312 The vote to adopt the new rules was an unusual three-
to-two split decision among the SEC commissioners. 313  The
(2000).
308 Gregory Zuckerman & Ian McDonald, Hedge Funds Avoid SEC Registration
Rule, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2005, at CI.
309 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000). This exemption is also known as the de
minimum exemption. See SEC STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 21.
310 SEC Hedge Fund Adviser Rule, supra note 40, at 72,069.
31 Id. at 72,054.
312 The rules that the SEC attempted to apply are provided in SEC Rule 203(b)(3)-2
and related amendments to other rules under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and
the Investment Advisers Act. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2 (2007); see also SEC Hedge
Fund Adviser Rule, supra note 40. However, the 2004 modifications were withdrawn.
313 See Judith Bums, SEC Approves Rule on Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1,
2004, at C15; SEC Hedge Fund Adviser Rule, supra note 40, at 72,089. The dissent
encouraged the majority to consider better alternatives, such as gathering more
information on hedge funds from other sources. Hedge Fund Adviser Rule, supra note
40,at 72,098; Bums, supra. The dissent noted that the SEC lacks the resources to
perform hedge fund examinations. SEC Hedge Fund Adivser Rule, supra note 40, at
72,073; Bums, supra. The dissent advocated that the SEC conduct empirical research.
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dissenting commissioners wanted SEC consideration of other
alternatives to hedge fund adviser regulation, such as more indirect
regulation through their prime brokers.
314
Under the Hedge Fund Advisers Rules, more hedge fund
advisers had to register with the SEC under the Advisers Act
before the February 2006 effective date. The new rules would
effectively disqualify many advisers from using the Private
Adviser Exemption to registration. 315 Registration under the
Advisers Act was a form of relatively light governmental
regulation. 316  Hedge funds registering with the SEC had to
disclose their past financial performance, key personnel, and other
information. 317 Registration would help the SEC track hedge fund
operations, enable the SEC to conduct examinations of hedge
funds, improve hedge fund disclosure, and bar convicted felons
from hedge fund management.
318
See Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address at the National
Economists Club: Observations of an Economist Commissioner on Leaving the SEC
(July 6, 2006), http://sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch070606cag.htm.
314 See Paul S. Atkins, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Keynote Address at the
Inaugural Edward Lane-Reticker Speaker Series sponsored by the Morin Center for
Banking and Financial Law: Protecting Investors Through Hedge Fund Advisor
Registration: Long on Costs, Short on Returns (March 30, 2006), in 25 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 537, 539 (2006).
315 Perhaps the debate over SEC registration of hedge funds was in fact a debate
over whether to enable the SEC to examine hedge funds. See Jeffrey B. Cobb, Time for
a Fresh Look at Advisory Registration of Hedge Fund Managers, INVESTMENT LAW.,
Oct. 2006, at 3, 12 (2006).
316 Gregory Zuckermann & Ian McDonald, The Wild West of Hedge Funds Becomes
Tamer, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2005, at Cl. Paul Roye, Director of the SEC's Investment
Management Division, stated "'we view the hedge-fund-adviser registration requirement
as a modest step."' Id.
317 Regulated investment advisers must file SEC form ADV. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-3
(2007). The first part of form ADV requires information on advisers, assets under
management, compensation, disciplinary history, types of clients served, and owners of
the firm. See Eleanor Laise & Rachel Emma Silverman, Dissecting Hedge-Fund
Secrets; Wealth-Managers Say SEC-Required Revelations Won't Replace Due
Diligence, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2006, at B5. The second part of the ADV form gives
details on the business background, fee schedule, education and experience of each key
member of the firm's investment group. Id.
318 Registration of hedge fund advisers would also effectively increase the minimum
investment required because registered advisers cannot charge performance fees unless
an investor has at least $750,000 invested or a net worth of $1.5 million. See SEC
STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at xii.
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Hedge fund managers are included in the definition of
"investment advisers ' 319 under the Advisers Act. 32  Particularly
when hedge funds do not treat all investors the same, the SEC
believes that such hedge fund advisers share a key characteristic of
investment advisers: the handling of separate investment accounts.
The intent of the regulation was to treat hedge funds as having
several separate investment accounts.321
The "look through rule" included in the SEC's Hedge Fund
Adviser Rules changed the method of counting the number of
clients for purposes of the Private Adviser Exemption.
Essentially, hedge fund advisers had to "look through" a private
fund and count each beneficial owner as a client to determine if
the fund had fourteen or fewer clients.322 The SEC explained that
without a "look through rule," a hedge fund adviser could
indirectly manage the assets of hundreds or thousands of investors.
The "look through" rule even applied to offshore hedge fund
advisers.
323
The attempted regulation increased the number of registered
hedge fund advisers. Prior to the SEC's attempted regulation of
hedge funds, about forty percent of hedge fund operators were
324
registered. Even though the District of Columbia Circuit Court
319 An investment adviser is defined as "any person who, for compensation, engages
in the business of advising others." 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-2(a)(l1) (2000). The advising
may occur either directly or through publications or writings, and may include advice as
to the value of securities or whether to purchase or sell securities. Id.
320 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that hedge fund general partners
are "investment advisers." See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 869-71 (2d Cir.
1977), overruled on other grounds by Transamerican Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11 (1979).
321 SEC Hedge Fund Adviser Rule, supra note 40, at 72,070.
322 Thus, for purposes of the Hedge Fund Advisers Rule, a "client" included each
shareholder, limited partner, member and beneficiary of a private fund. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
3 (2000).
323 An offshore adviser is a hedge fund adviser whose principal place of business is
outside the United States. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.902, 230.903. "Offshore advisers" of hedge
funds also had to look through their funds and count any U.S. residents as clients. Id.
An offshore adviser had to register if the adviser did not qualify for the private adviser
exemption. See 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(b)(3) (2000). Thus, the offshore adviser was subject to
SEC regulation if the adviser had more than fourteen clients who were residents of the
United States. Id.
324 Bums, supra note 313. About a 1,000 hedge fund advisers registered before the
February 2006 registration deadline. Kara Scannell, Making Hedge Funds Less Secret;
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of Appeals decision caused some hedge funds to de-list from SEC
registration,325 it is estimated that most of the world's hedge funds
are monitored by the SEC or another regulator. 326 A substantial
portion of hedge fund advisers have continued the improved
business practices implemented as a result of registration.
327
C. Judicial Inflexibility, Congressional Talk, and the SEC's
Proposal
Philip Goldstein, a hedge fund manager, wanted to continue to
qualify under the Private Adviser Exemption. He challenged the
SEC's new Hedge Fund Adviser Rule under the Administrative
Procedures Act.328 The SEC concluded that it had the authority to
adopt the challenged regulations and justified the Hedge Fund
Adviser Rule primarily on policy grounds. One justification given
by the SEC for the regulations was that not all hedge funds treat
all investors the same. 329 The SEC cited different lock-up periods,
greater access to information, lower fees, and side-pocket
arrangements, and thus demonstrated that each hedge fund
investor account has many characteristics of separate accounts and
should be treated as comprised of separate clients.
330
When litigated before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Goldstein v. SEC,331  the court, in a
SEC's Registration Requirement Provides a New Insiders' Look; That Old Underage-
Driving Case, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2006, at C1.
325 The SEC reported that over 2,500 hedge fund advisers were registered with the
SEC as of June 23, 2006. See Doug Halonen, Legislation Seen As Necessary to Revive
Hedge Fund Registration, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Aug. 7, 2006, at 19 (2006).
However, at least 275 hedge funds have delisted from SEC registration after the court
invalidated the SEC's hedge fund rule. Siobhan Hughes, More Hedge Funds Leave the
Ranks of SEC's Registry, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2006, at C4.
326 Most Hedge Funds Still Watched by Regulators - Survey, REUTERS, Dec. 5, 2006
(a survey conducted by the Henessee hedge fund concluded that eighty-six percent of
hedge funds are monitored by some entity) (on file with author).
327 Hedge-Fund Changes Appear to Live On, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2006, at CI1.
328 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 26, Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (No. 04-1434) (arguing that the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2),
requires setting aside an agency rule if it is in excess of its statutory authority).
329 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 882.
330 id.
331 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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unanimous opinion on June 23, 2006, vacated the SEC's Hedge
Fund Adviser Rule. 332 The court found that the SEC's rules were
arbitrary and the SEC's explanation inadequate as to why
investors were treated as clients for purposes of determining
whether an adviser must register with the SEC.3 33
The court in Goldstein focused on the definition of a "client."
The SEC has the authority to regulate an investment adviser with
more than fifteen clients. 334  The Adviser's Act did not define
"client," but since 1985 the SEC treated an entity as a single
client. 335  The court noted that it presumes the same words in
different parts of a statue have the same meaning. 336 Since the
SEC couldn't explain why "client" should have one meaning when
determining the fiduciary duties owed and another meaning when
determining whether an investment adviser must register, the court
concluded the SEC's change in the definition of a client for
purposes of registration was arbitrary. 337 The court concluded that
the SEC's interpretation of "client" fell "outside the bounds of
reasonableness." 338  The court explained that reasonableness
depended on the statutory language and purpose. 339  The court
found the SEC's rule violated the plain language of the statute.
340
Various proposed legislative responses have arisen after the
court's decision in Goldstein. Rep. Barney Frank quickly co-
sponsored the "SEC Authority Restoration Act of 2006" to enable
the SEC to regulate hedge funds.341 Although Rep. Frank became
the chair of the House Financial Services Committee in 2007, he
has since altered his position. As a result, the House Financial
332 Id. at 884.
313 Id. at 882-84.
334 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2000).
... Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 879 n.5, 880.
336 Id. at 882 (citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478,484 (1990)).
337 Id. at 882-83.
338 Id. at 881.
339 Id.
340 The court vacated and remanded the SEC's revised hedge fund rule. Id. at 884.
341 SEC Authority Restoration Act of 2006, H.R. 5712, 109th Cong. (2006). Rep.
Barney Frank, who introduced the bill, later decided to forgo this approach and let the
Federal Reserve have more oversight. Editorial, Educating Cox, N.Y. SUN, July 27,
2006, at 10.
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Services Committee has merely pursued informational hearings
and is expected to examine the investment in hedge funds by
public pension funds. 342 The extent of pension fund investment in
hedge funds has also raised the concern of Senator Arlen Specter.
In December 2006, Sen. Specter proposed draft legislation that
would require the registration of any hedge fund having more than
a five percent investment from pension funds. Sen. Specter's
proposal addresses the retailization issue more effectively than the
SEC's proposed approach to limit individual shareholders.
343
Even before the court's decision, Congress had discussed
federal legislation to address hedge funds.344  Especially after
witnessing the damage caused by hedge fund fraud, the
Connecticut Attorney General advocated federal action, or state
action if needed.345 As Senator Grassley explained in a bill known
as the "Hedge Fund Registration Act," at a minimum, the SEC
needs to know who is controlling the "massive pool of money in
hedge funds to ensure the integrity and security of the [financial]
markets."
346
The SEC proposed new regulations affecting hedge funds in
December 2006. The proposal had two rules providing very
342 See Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk in Financial Markets: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. (2007).
343 Ron Orol, Specter: Hedges Need Oversight, THE DAILY DEAL, Dec. 6, 2006.
344 After LTCM, a bill was introduced in the House called the "Hedge Fund
Disclosure Act." Hedge Fund Disclosure Act, H.R. 2924, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill
would have required unregulated hedge funds to report to the Federal Reserve System.
See Scott J. Lederman, Hedge Funds, in FINANCIAL PRODUCT FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE
FOR LAWYERS § 11-7 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2006).
345 Jeremy Grant & Stephen Schurr, Hedge Funds Face Fresh Calls for More
Regulatory Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES, June 29, 2006, at 1. Connecticut's Department of
Banking created a unit overseeing hedge funds in that state after the high profile hedge
fund failures of Bayou Management and Amaranth Advisers in 2006. See Jennifer
McCandless, Connecticut Creates Hedge Fund Oversight Unit, FIN. NEWS, Oct. 9, 2006,
http://www.financialnews-us.com/
?page=ushome&contentid=1045604943. In 2007, Connecticut is considering stricter
hedge fund rules, presumably to discourage tougher action at the federal level.
Connecticut Considers Stricter Hedge Fund Rules, N.Y.TIMES DEALBOOK, Feb. 9, 2007,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/02/09/connecticut-considers-stricter-hedge-
fund-rules/.
346 Hedge Funds: Grassley Bill Would Close 'Loophole' Allowing Fund Advisers
Not to Register, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA), May 16, 2007.
347 See Judith Burns, SEC Adopts Fraud Rule Affecting Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J.
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light oversight of hedge funds. In July 2007, the SEC adopted one
rule, applying the anti-fraud parts of the securities laws to both
investors and proposed investors in hedge funds, rather than just to
the clients of hedge funds.34 8  Thus, under the anti-fraud rule, a
hedge fund adviser cannot make false or misleading statements to
investors or proposed investors, even if the hedge fund operates
under an exemption to the Investment Company Act.
349
The other proposed SEC rule for hedge funds was a new
proposed term "accredited natural person." The concept of an
"accredited natural person" substantially reduces the number of
individuals qualifying to invest in hedge funds. 350  After
widespread public criticism, 351 the SEC is conducting further
review and may be reluctant to ever adopt its second proposal.
This article advocates far more stringent government regulation,
such as the registration of hedge fund advisors.
ONLINE, July 11, 2007; Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment
Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Securities Act
Release No. 8766, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2576, [2006-2007 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 87,736 (Dec. 27, 2006). The SEC rationalized the
rule by pointing out that only 1.7% of U.S. households qualified when the accredited
investor rules were first implemented in 1982; 8.5% of U.S. households qualified under
the accredited investor rules prior to the adoption of the new rule. Burns, supra.
348 See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles;
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, supra note 347, at 84,042-
43. Mr. Goldstein has once again threatened to challenge the new SEC rule if the SEC
does not determine that his fund qualifies under an exemption. See Jenny Strasburg,
Goldstein Asks SEC for Hedge-Fund Filing Exemption, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 24, 2006,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=ajWZjtcAeRUM&refer=us;
Do Hedge Funds Hold 'Trade Secrets'?, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Sept. 13, 2006.
349 Editorial, Hedge Fund Secrets, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2006, at A16.
350 The SEC's proposed new rule adds a new category of "accredited natural
person." Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles;
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, supra note 347, at 84,047-
48. The new category adds a requirement for accredited investors to own at least $2.5
million in investments, excluding their own homes. Id. at 84,048.
351 For a directory of comments submitted to the SEC, see Comments on Proposed
Rule: Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles;
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, http://www.sec.gov
/comments/s7-25-06/s72506.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
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V. Reforms for More Effective SEC Regulation of Hedge
Funds
Reforms for effective financial regulation of hedge funds must
consider how a regulation promotes the SEC's major strategic
goals. 352 Those goals are (1) to enforce compliance with federal
securities laws; (2) to promote healthy capital markets through an
effective and flexible regulatory environment; 353 and (3) to foster
informed decision-making by investors.354 Effective, prudent, and
non-bureaucratic SEC regulation of hedge funds is needed to
acquire information on hedge fund activity necessary to prevent
financial catastrophes, to deter fraud, and to assure efficient
markets.
The reforms proposed in this article arise in part from
international coordination needed for effective regulation of hedge
funds in the global economy, as discussed in Part V.a. The need
for hedge fund registration and periodic examination of hedge
funds is discussed in Part V.b., and is the critical part of regulation
that is needed to reduce systemic risk to the financial markets from
hedge fund activity. Part V.c. proposes regulation to provide
ordinary investor protection against fraud, to improve market
efficiency through increased disclosure by hedge funds, and for
other rules of conduct and governance for greater integrity in the
market.
A. Regulating Hedge Funds in the Global Economy
There are three basic reasons to regulate financial investments:
first, to reduce systemic risk; second, to protect investors; and
352 Similarly to the SEC, IOSCO has adopted three core objectives: protecting
investors; ensuring markets are fair, efficient, and transparent; and reducing systemic
risk. IOSCO, supra note 5, at 13.
353 "The empirical evidence strongly indicates that countries with mandatory
disclosure, strong antifraud protections, [and] insider trading prohibitions ... tend both
to have stronger, more efficient capital markets and to enable companies to raise capital
more efficiently." Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 775, 778 (2006).
354 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, IN BRIEF: FISCAL 2007 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
REQUEST 6 (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy07budgetreq.pdf. The
SEC also has an internally focused fourth strategic goal to maximize the use of SEC
resources. Id.
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third, to assure efficient markets. 355  "Prudential regulation" to
reduce systemic risk should consider the extent of potential danger
from the high degree of leverage which is often used in the hedge
fund industry, as well as the risk management procedures of the
parties involved in hedge fund financial transactions, particularly
for transactions involving derivatives. 356  "Market integrity
regulation" helps to protect investors from fraud. Such regulation
is achieved by requiring hedge funds to register with the
government to assure compliance with fiduciary duties, adviser
qualification requirements, 357 proper business structures, and other
appropriate regulatory measures. 358  A secondary effect of such
regulation is to encourage efficient markets, usually by ensuring
knowledgeable investors who have access to reliable financial
information disclosure.359  Most financial products are subject to
extensive regulation for a combination of these three regulatory
reasons. 360
355 Jane Diplock, Chairman, IOSCO Executive Comm., Chairman, Sec. Comm'n of
N.Z., Address at the Independent Commission Against Corruption Corporate Corruption,
Integrity and Governance Symposium: IOSCO - A Global Standard Setter (May 11,
2006), http://www.seccom.govt.nz/speeches/2006/jds110506.shtml. Accurate pricing
and high liquidity are characteristic of efficient markets. Zohar Goshen & Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DuKE L.J. 711, 720
(2006). Specifically, "accurate pricing is essential for achieving efficient allocation of
resources in the economy." Id. High liquidity occurs when large safes can occur
"without causing a substantial price effect." Id.
356 If the leading global investment banks maintain adequate counterparty risk and
liquidity management systems and operation, then leverage in the hedge fund industry
should only represent a marginal risk to the stability of the global financial system.
Swiss NAT'L BANK, supra note 246, at 55.
357 Investors in small funds often entrust their money to charismatic individuals with
whom they are not well-acquainted, and these managers sometimes lack the type of
experience needed to trade in large sums. Peter A. McKay, How Untested Trader
Attracted Millions to Failed Hedge Fund, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2004, at C1. A small, but
growing number of hedge fund managers have little or no relevant prior experience.
Wanted: Hedge Fund Manager, No Experience Necessary, Bus. WEEK ONLINE, Mar. 6,
2006.
358 For many institutional investors, registration became an important criterion in
selecting hedge funds. Swiss NAT'L BANK, supra note 246, at 55.
359 The hedge fund industry argues that disclosure is counter productive for an
industry that helps to provide a market-based price finding mechanism. Id. Some also
argue that the high volume of hedge fund activity makes it unrealistic for hedge funds or
the custodian to compile the information on a timely basis. Id.
360 Regulation of mutual funds requires a degree of liquidity in the fund, redeemable
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To make regulation effective, a governmental agency should
consider six principles: consistency, accountability, transparency,
proportionality, effectiveness, and necessity (CATPEN). The
SEC should consider these CATPEN principles for any potential
SEC regulation of hedge funds. The principles suggest that the
SEC regulation should exist only when some necessity for the
regulation exists, such as concerns about systemic risk. An SEC
regulation should not exist if it will not effectively achieve the
SEC's goals. For such policies to be effective, the regulatory costs
imposed should have some proportional relationship to the
potential benefits achieved from the regulation. Finally,
transparency in execution and consistency in enforcement are
indispensable in implementing effective regulation. Transparency
is necessary to make the regulation understandable to participants
while enforcement provides consistency in application and
increased accountability.
362The increasingly globalized financial markets, as well as the
enormous size and impact of hedge funds, encourage the SEC to
continue to work with major international organizations and
securities regulators in other countries. A coordinated
mutual fund shares, protections against conflicts of interest, fairness in the pricing of
mutual fund shares, disclosure, and limits on the use of leverage. Hedge Fund Center,
The SEC's Definition of a Hedge Fund, http://www.hedgefundcenter.com (follow
"Basics" hyperlink; then follow "The SEC's Definition of a Hedge Fund" hyperlink)
(last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
361 See ROINN AN TAOISIGH, DEPARTMENT OF THE TAOISEACH, REGULATING BETTER
6 (2004), available at http://www.betterregulation.ie/attached files/upload/
static/RegulatingBetterGovernmentWhitePaper.pdf. Without registration, the SEC can
investigate hedge funds only after an investor suspects fraud and contacts the SEC. SEC
STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 76. The U.S. stock exchanges are "self regulatory
organizations" and perhaps fail to provide adequate investigation and enforcement when
wrongdoing occurs. See Ron Orol & Donna Block, SEC's Grip on Hedge Funds
Reviewed, DAILY DEAL, Oct. 30, 2006. However, the NASD imposed its largest fine to
date, in excess of $2 million, on a hedge fund CEO who engaged in improper market
timing. Hedge Fund CEO Fined $2.25 Million, HEDGE FUND STREET, Oct. 29, 2006,
available at http://www.fundstreet.org/2006/10/hedge-fund ceo .html.
362 Multiple overlapping identities, such as allegiance to more than one country,
exist in the global financial markets for many entities and individuals. See John G.
Moon, The Dangerous Territoriality of American Securities Law: A Proposal for an
Integrated Global Securities Market, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 131, 133 (2006).
363 See Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address at the 34th
Annual Securities Regulation Institute: Re-Thinking Regulation in the Era of Global
Securities Markets (Jan. 24, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/
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international regulatory approach is particularly important with
countries that have major financial centers. 364  Increasingly,
governments are trying to harmonize not only their accounting
standards, 365 but also part of their financial regulations. 366  The
reality is that achievement of regulatory goals requires a cross-
jurisdictional effort. 367  Once the United States adopts necessary
regulation of hedge funds, other countries are expected to
follow. 368 However, significant differences in national approaches
to hedge fund regulation may continue to exist, particularly
regarding whether the ordinary investor should have retail access
to hedge funds.
369
Major international organizations are concerned about the risks
spch012407cc.htm (noting that "fraudsters" now network their wrongful activities from
many different countries).
364 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
44-45 (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2006.pdf.
365 See Annette L. Nazareth, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the
NYSE Regulation Second Annual Securities Conference (June 20, 2006); Thomas C.
Pearson, Creating Accountability: Increased Legal Status of Accounting and Auditing
Authorities in the Global Capital Markets (U.S. and EU), 31 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 65, 68-69 (2005).
366 Harmonization of financial regulations is especially noticeable in Europe, which
is home to approximately one-quarter of hedge fund issuances. See generally
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE REGULATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF HEDGE FUNDS IN
EUROPE: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES 4-8 (2005), http://www.pwc.com/extweb/
pwcpublications.nsf/docid/44343824ED0025ED85256EA80052D97A (follow "June
2005" hyperlink). The European Union's "Markets in Financial Instruments Directive"
(MiFID) created higher disclosure standards, responsibilities for regulators, and a "single
passport" within the E.U. for financial instruments, including derivatives. See Ben
Maiden et al., Fifteen Trends to Expect in 2006, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 2006, at 25.
367 See Neil Behrmann, US and UK Regulators Extend Co-operation to Counter
Market Abuse and Fraud, INFOVEST21 NEWS, Nov. 22, 2006; see also Robert B. Ahdieh,
Dialect Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 865-66 (2006); Eric J. Pan, Harmonization of
U.S.-E.U. Securities Regulation: The Case for a Single European Securities Regulator,
34 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 499, 527 (2003).
368 See VON COTT1ER, supra note 6, at 10 ("Regulatory authorities of countries like
the U.K., France, Japan, Luxembourg, and Ireland have based their national futures fund
laws on [U.S.-based] CFTC and SEC rules.").
369 Charlie McCreevey, European Comm'r, Internal Mkt. & Services, Remarks at
the Open Hearing on Retail Investment Funds, Market Efficiency, Hedge Funds and
Private Equity Funds (July 19, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/465&format=HTML&aged=0&la
(follow "PDF: EN" hyperlink).
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posed by hedge funds. In 2007, the Group of Eight (G8) countries
aim to promote hedge fund transparency. 37  Germany, which is
leading the G8 in 2007, has suggested that hedge funds voluntarily
adopt a code of conduct governing corporate governance and
submit to voluntary ratings of investment strategies. 371  The
International Organization of Securities Commissioners
(IOSCO)372 is also investigating hedge fund regulation issues.
IOSCO is in the process of developing a "Code of Practice" for
hedge fund valuations and prices. 3W The European Union
encourages the hedge fund industry to adopt a self-regulatory
approach.374 Coordinated government regulation, however, is
especially critical when industry self-regulation fails. 37 5 The need
370 Andrea Thomas, G-8 Panel Wants More Disclosure from Hedge Funds, WALL
ST. J. ONLINE, May 21, 2007; see also Andrea Thomas, The Buzz: G-7 Asked to See If
More Data Are Needed on Hedge-Fund Risks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2007, at B3. The
suggested regulatory baby steps will be included in an updated report on hedge fund
practices and are expected to lead to discussions with the hedge fund industry about
regulatory options. Jonathan Spalter, Hedge Funds Face a Stark Choice: Revelation or
Regulation, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at 15. The G-20 will also examine hedge fund
regulation. See Stewart Bailey, G-20 to Tackle Hedge Fund Secrecy, Bus. REP. (S. Afr.),
Nov. 22, 2006, available at http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionld
=561 &fArticleld=3555403.
371 See Kara Scannell et al., No Consensus on Regulating Hedge Funds; Officials
Around the World Aim to Protect Markets But Differ on Methods, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5,
2007, at C l, C2.
372 IOSCO consists of financial market regulators who cooperate together to
promote standards of securities regulations in order to maintain stable and effective
financial markets. Int'l Org. of Sec. Commissions, IOSCO Historical Background,
http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=history (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
IOSCO has over one-hundred securities agencies that regulate more than ninety-percent
of the world's capital markets. Id. IOSCO has developed "Objectives and Principles of
Securities Regulation" which promote investor protection, fairness, efficiency, and
transparency in the capital markets. Id. IOSCO also seeks to reduce the systemic risks.
Id. The IOSCO principles are used by the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank when conducting financial assessments. Jane Diplock, Chairman, IOSCO
Executive Comm., Chairman, Sec. Comm'n of N.Z., Address at the 17th Asian Pacific
Conference on Accounting Issues: IOSCO Response to Accounting Scandals (Nov. 21-
22, 2005), http://www.seccom.govt.nz/speeches/2005/jds221 105.shtml.
373 IOSCO's "Code of Practice" is expected by June 2007.
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 251, at 4.
374 See Joe Kirwin, Hedge Funds: Divided EU Finance Ministers Opt for Self-
Regulation of Fund Industry, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA), May 9, 2007.
375 For example, the failures of industry self-regulation of auditors led Congress to
enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and create the "Public Company Accounting Oversight
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for a harmonized international approach to financial regulation in
general and to regulation of hedge funds in particular is more
apparent in an age of cross-border stock exchanges.
376
The United Kingdom's regulation of financial services,
377
including hedge funds,378 ,is particularly noteworthy because the
U.K. represents the largest component of European hedge fund
activity.. The U.K.'s regulation uses a principles-based
approach to financial regulation 380 in an effort to make the
regulation more transparent. In contrast, the U.S. uses a rules-
based approach, epitomized by the unadopted, proposed SEC
regulation that introduced the regulatory term "accredited natural
person" in an effort to limit the class of hedge fund investors. 381 A
Board" to regulate auditors. See 15 U.S.C. § 7218 (2000). Industry self-regulation has
five potential disadvantages: "[c]onflicts of [i]nterest[,] ... [i]nadequate [s]anctions[,] ..
[u]nderenforcement[,] . . . [g]lobal [c]ompetition[,] . . . [and] [i]nsufficient
[r]esources." Cary Coglianese et al., The Role of Government in Corporate Governance,
1 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 219, 225 (2004).
376 See Paul S. Atkins, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the Institute of
European -Affairs (Sept; . 29, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/
spch092906psa.htm (stating that merger negotiations between the New York Stock
Exchange and Euronext highlight "the need for a cooperative, mutually respecting
regulatory approach" for overseeing hedge funds).
377 Although the European Union has standardized some financial regulation,
countries often have their own additional laws. The U.K. has recently made progress in
updating its securities laws. Fin. Services Auth., Hedge Funds and the FSA [ 2.3 (Fin.
Services Auth., Discussion Paper No. 16, 2002), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/
dpl6.pdf. The U.K.'s Financial Services Authority has debated whether to liberalize its
laws restricting the sale of hedge funds to retail investors. Id. 1.6.
378 Canadian hedge funds are registered with provincial regulators. See David
Clarke, New Hedge Fund Regulation Not Likely in Canada; In-force Regulations Seen
Adequate for Alternative Investments, INVESTMENT NEWS, Mar. 13, 2006, at 17. David
Wilson, the new chairman of the Ontario Securities Commission, would like stricter
rules on hedge funds.' He is seeking greater disclosure and tougher penalties for fraud
and insider trading. See Thaddeus C. Kopinski, CIBC Move May Spur Election Change
in Canada, GOVERNANCE WEEKLY, Jan. 6, 2006 (on file with author).
379 Swiss Hunt U.K. Hedge Funds, ACCOUNTANCY AGE, Apr. 19, 2007.
380 The Wilder Side of Finance; Regulating Hedge Funds, ECONOMIST, July 1, 2006,
at 11. The U.K.'s FSA has announced a strategic shift from a prescriptive to a
principles-based approach in the regulation of investment services. See COMM. ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMM1ITEE ON CAPITAL
MARKETS REGULATION 55 (2006), http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/lI .30Committee
_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf. By the end of 2007, the FSA expects to replace its "Conduct
of Business Rules" with new ones using a principles-based approach. Id.
381 See supra p. 69 and note 350 and accompanying text. Corporate governance in
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principles-based approach 382 allows regulators more flexibility and
places a greater burden of compliance on hedge funds in meeting
the intent of a regulation.
383
Highly developed countries like Canada, France, Japan, and
Australia are increasingly establishing some type of regulation
over hedge funds. 384 Australia, for example, relies heavily on the
consistency principle of regulation by having a financial services
law with a single code that regulates a vast variety of financial
products, including hedge funds. 385  Australia's financial law
achieves an efficient market through licensing, disclosure, and
other methods to ensure fair conduct. 386 With these regulations in
place, Australia allows the retail purchase of hedge funds by
individual investors.387
The U.S. Congress should follow the both U.K.'s lead and
require the registration of hedge fund advisers as well as
the E.U. often adheres to a principles-based "comply or explain" process. COMM. ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 380, at 63.
382 The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation advocates that the SEC adopt
more principles-based rules as the basis for its regulatory standards. Id. at 63-65. The
Committee also advocates reducing the size of the primarily prescriptive rulebook. Id. at
64.
383 "A change in mutual-fund rules applicable across the EU, known as UCITS III,
has meant that hedge-fund practices are also available to retail investors." Rolling In It;
Hedge Funds, ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 2006, at 75.
384 See David Wilson, Chair, Ontario Sec. Comm'n, Keynote Address at the
Dialogue with the OSC: Momentum for Change: Providing the Regulation Canada
Needs (Nov. 10, 2006), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Media/Speeches/sp-20061110
_dw-dwo-momentum.jsp; Jr6me Sutour, The Evolution of the Regulation of Alternative
Management in France, AlMA J., Feb. 2005, available at
http://www.aima.org/uploads/Simmons65.pdf. In France, regulation of hedge funds is
extensive, from management fees to leverage rations. See Matt Miller, The European
Cure, DAILY DEAL, Feb. 5, 2007; Japan's Hedge Funds Face Increased Scrutiny,
REUTERS, June 12, 2006, available at http://asia.news.yahoo.com/060612/3/21ryg.html.
385 See Gail Pearson, Risk and the Consumer in Australia Financial Services
Reform, 28 SYDNEY L. REV. 99, 136 (2006). Switzerland also allows sales of FOFs to
private individuals without any investor qualifications. See Antoinette Hunziker-
Ebneter, More Transparency for Funds of Hedge Funds: The Swiss Case, EUROMONEY,
at 5, 6-7, http://www.zhaw.ch/fileadmin/user-upload/management/zai/publikationen/
pdf/fachartikel euromoney.pdf.
386 See Pearson, supra note 385, at 99.
387 See Rita Raagas de Ramos, Concerns Over Hedge Funds Rise As Market
Volatility Rises Globally, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2006, at C5. Cf.
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 251, at 37.
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Australia's example and place all financial investments on a level
playing field. Individuals often rely upon advisers for financial
sophistication.388 Hedge fund advisers should not escape basic
regulation applicable to other investment advisers. One
reasonable alternative to achieve a level playing field among
financial investments is modifying the application of mutual fund
regulations as appropriate to hedge funds. Although it is not
surprising that registration of hedge funds is supported by the
leading trade group for mutual funds, it is helpful to point out that
these investments are not currently on a level playing field.389
The U.S. President's Working Group has attempted to preempt
potential regulation by calling for more market discipline by hedge
fund creditors, counterparties, and investors. 39  The Working
Group advocates the adoption of non-binding guidelines by hedge
funds and their lenders in order to make hedge funds more
transparent to investors and make creditors more vigilant.
391
B. Reducing Market Failures and Fraud Through Prudential
Regulation
Financial market failures arise because of systemic threats,
market misconduct, information asymmetry, and anticompetitivebehavior. 392 Systemic risks can Jeopardize the complex but fragile
international financial system.393  Market misconduct can reduce
388 For example, several professional football players with limited financial
knowledge invested more than $15 million in a hedge fund with a scam-artist manager.
Ian McDonald & Valerie Bauerlein, Hedge Fund's Assets Hard to Find; Bench Warrant
for Arrest of Atlanta Firm's Chief Is Issued in Fraud Inquiry, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27,
2006, at C3. SEC registration of hedge fund advisers might have prevented that manager
from operating a hedge fund. See id.
389 See Bums, supra note 313.
390 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, President's Working Group
Releases Common Approach to Private Pools of Capital; Guidance on Hedge Fund
Issues Focuses on Systemic Risk, Investor Protection (Feb. 22, 2007),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp272.htm; see also Deborah Solomon, Regulators'
Hedge Fund Approach: Hands Off, WALL ST. J. Feb. 23, 2007, at C 1.
391 See Timothy Spangler, Working Group Guidance, DAILY DEAL, Mar. 1, 2007.
392 See JEFFREY CARMICHAEL & MICHAEL POMERLEANO, DEVELOPMENT AND
REGULATION OF NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 23 (World Bank 2002).
393 Systemic risk describes the possibility of a series of correlated defaults among
financial institutions that occurs over a short time-horizon, often caused by a single
major event. See Chan et al., supra note 64, at 1.
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investor confidence to participate in the financial markets.
Information asymmetry arises when disclosure by itself is
insufficient to enable consumers to make informed choices.
Anticompetitive behavior can arise when hedge funds act together.
"Prudential regulation," such as requiring hedge funds to register
with the SEC, attempts to prevent these market failures.
While systemic risks associated with hedge funds are reducible
through government regulation, they cannot fully disappear. 394
Except for initial lock-up limitations and periodic redemption
restrictions, hedge funds are vulnerable to "runs on the bank"
when investors are worried and demand withdrawal all at once. 395
Regulatory policy should seek to reduce systemic threats and
prevent the type of financial crisis that almost occurred with
LTCM.396 Relying on the risk management systems of financial
institutions is not always adequate protection. 397
Regulators should worry that financial institutions and
managers underestimate the likelihood of severe events and
overestimate their ability to take needed corrective action that is
both effective and timely. 398  Regulators have a role to play in
reducing the risk that the private sector's risk management
processes have eroded. Regulations should help assure that hedge
funds implement proper internal controls.399 It is desirable to have
394 See Hong Kong HKMA Says Hedge Funds Need Close Monitoring, XINHUA FIN.
NETWORK NEWS, Jan. 30, 2007 (discussing the concerns of the Hong Kong Monetary
Authority regarding hedge funds and systemic risk).
395 See Henny Sender, Hedge Funds Hit Rough Weather But Stay Course, WALL ST.
J., June 22, 2006, at C1.
396 In the last twenty-five years, the LTCM crisis, combined with the Asian and
Russian crises of 1998, is considered one of three major financial shocks in the "red
zone" of systemic risk. CRM POLICY GROUP II, supra note 6, at 5-6. The other two
dangerous financial shocks were the developing economies debt and banking crisis of the
early 1980s and the stock market crash of 1987. Id.
397 Int'l Org. of Sec. Commissions, Technical Comm., Hedge Funds and Other
Highly Leveraged Institutions 6 (1999), http://www.iosco.org/lAibrary/
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD98.pdf. An example of inadequate protection occurred in the
case of a hedge fund manager suffering from severe depression. See Susanne Craig,
When Hedge-Fund Selling Bites Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2006, at Cl. The
hedge fund manager stopped monitoring the funds and significant losses for investors
resulted. Id.
398 What Keeps Bankers Awake at Night?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 2007, at 73
(referencing the Financial Services Authority in its latest Financial Risk Outlook).
399 Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2000) (setting forth the statutory authority for such
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clear regulatory expectations, diligently enforced, and, ideally,
couple those expectations with regulatory incentives. A
combination of regulatory expectations and incentives will help
improve risk management and reduce the likelihood of systemic
risk.
Systemic risks arise from a new "triangle of vulnerability"
connecting hedge funds,400 credit derivatives,4 °1 and the credit
402cycle. Particularly in the derivatives market, financial
regulators know that more regulatory effort is needed to avert
systemic threats to the capital markets.403  Thus, the SEC along
with other leading organizations issued a warning in Fall 2006 that
countries must join forces to help contain the risk presented by the
global expansion of derivatives,40 4 even though derivatives often
regulations).
400 Survey information suggests hedge funds have improved their risk management
capabilities since 1999. See CRM POLICY GROUP II, supra note 6, at B-1. While more
derivatives are traded on regulated futures and option exchanges, some are traded in over
the counter markets that have little regulation. Id. at D-3.
401 Credit derivatives are privately negotiated agreements that shift credit risk from
one party to another so as to act as insurance policies against corporate defaults. See
Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk in the Financial Markets, supra note 78, at 126; Greg
Ip, Geithner's Balancing Act: The Fund's Go-To Man for Financial Crises Takes on
Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2007, at Cl, C2. Since their introduction in the mid-
1990s, credit derivatives have grown dramatically. At the end of 2005, $17 trillion of
credit derivative contracts were estimated to exist. See Role of Hedge Funds in Our
Capital Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities and Investment of the S.
Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 10 (2006) (statement of the
Managed Fund Assoc.), available at http://banking.senate.gov/files/gaine.pdf. While
financial institutions, mainly banks, used to handle credit risk, that activity is now
frequently outsourced through credit derivatives to highly leveraged hedge funds as
counterparties. See Tim Reason, Who's Holding the Bag?, CFO, Oct. 2005, at 40, 42-
43; see also Letter from Joerg Schroeder to Senator Christopher Dodd (Jan. 2, 2007) (on
file with author).
402 See Joellen Perry & Alistair MacDonald, European Banker Urges Disclosure on
Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2006, at C4.
403 The primary goal of most regulatory bodies is to better understand hedge fund
operations and their potential impact on systemic risk. INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES 45-58 (Int'l
Monetary Fund 2004), available at http://www.imf.org/ExternaUPubs/FT/
GFSR/2004/02/index.htm (follow "Global Financial Market Developments" hyperlink).
404 See World Finance Watchdogs Focus on Opaque Derivatives Market, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 30, 2006 (other organizations included the U.K.'s Financial
Services Authority and the Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y.).
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serve a valuable purpose in the financial markets.4 °5
Systemic risks are minimized by having hedge fund advisers
register with the SEC. Registration helps policymakers acquire
necessary information about hedge funds to make more effective
policy decisions. 40 6  Regulators need the ability to assess the
possibilities of systemic losses and financial market disruptions
due to hedge fund losses from complex financial instruments.
Given the tremendous size of hedge funds, systemic risk is a real
concern.
Market misconduct is more likely if hedge funds remain able
to use non-transparent, offshore entities while still benefiting from
favorable U.S. tax law. The U.S. government should also be
concerned about the integrity of the offshore financial centers and
tax havens which provide administrative services to hedge funds.
Tax havens often have secrecy laws that help both to hide the
activities of hedge funds and to distort the information that
policymakers need and revenue authorities depend upon.40 7 The
President's Working Group recognized that the U.S. Treasury
Department needs a comprehensive solution to the tax haven
problem so it can address the related concerns posed by offshore
hedge funds.
40 8
Information asymmetry becomes a more important concern as
the financial markets use sophisticated technology to exploit small409
differences in information. Some argue that by allowing the
stock markets in the world's major financial centers to integrate,
governments could track a substantial portion of the hedge funds'
405 After studying the financial fiascos during the last two decades, a noted
securities law professor advocates treating derivatives like other financial products. See
FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED 397 (Times Books 2003).
406 Registration not only helps the SEC acquire census information from hedge
funds, but also facilitates detection and deterrence of hedge funds involved in fraud and
prevents investment in those hedge funds. See Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk in the
Financial Markets, supra note 78, at 64-67 (statement of Kenneth D. Brody, Co-Founder
& Principal, Taconic Capital Advisors, LP).
407 Offshore tax havens or "Offshore Financial Centers," also have little or no tax on
investment income derived in the tax haven. See Prem Sikka, The Role of Offshore
Financial Centres in Globalization, 27 ACCT. FORUM 365, 366 (2003).
408 WORKING GROUP REPORT I, supra note 46, at 41.
409 Information asymmetry requires regulating insider trading.
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financial flows. 4 10  Although this would help the SEC make a
more appropriate determination as to whether leverage or other
restrictions are needed to prevent hedge funds from potentially
overwhelming a financial market, it is not enough. Further
prudential regulation by the U.S. is needed for hedge funds.
Anticompetitive behavior exhibited by hedge funds is
demonstrated by empty voting practices. Empty voting involves
separating voting rights from economic ownership to undermine a
company's economic position, and then profiting by short-selling
when the resulting vote is announced. Corporate governance
reforms are needed at least to disclose such practices.411
Professors Hu and Black, in their seminal analysis of empty
voting, provide a proposal for "integrated ownership disclosure
412
rules," so that empty voting is properly disclosed. While their
proposal is a logical first step, other proposals deserve
consideration.413
C. Ensuring Efficient Markets Through Enhanced Market
Integrity Regulation
"Market integrity regulation" focuses on increased disclosure
of relevant information and other rules for proper conduct of
business.414 Market integrity regulation helps to protect economic
growth.415 SOX provided market integrity regulation for public
410 Track the Hedge Funds: Hong Kong's Finance Czar Takes on the Hot Money,
ASIAWEEK, Oct. 23, 1998.
41 The Justice Department is examining the anticompetitive behavior of private
equity and hedge funds. Dennis K. Berman & Henny Sender, Private-Equity Firms Face
Anticompetitive Probe, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2006, at A3.
412 See Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 203, at 820. Their proposal
replaces, simplifies, and modernizes the SEC's five sets of disclosure rules for large
shareholders (mutual fund reporting, insider disclosure, institutional money manager
reporting, and large shareholder reporting on Schedules 13D and 13G). See id.
413 See, e.g., Charles M. Nathan, "Empty Voting" and Other Fault Lines
Undermining Shareholder Democracy: The New Hunting Ground for Hedge Funds,
M&A DEAL COMMENTARY, Sept. 2006, http://athamandwatkins.com/upload/pubContent
/_pdf/pub1689_l.pdf (proposing a time-phased voting system where voting is keyed to
duration of ownership).
414 CARMICHAEL & POMERLEANO, supra note 392, at 26.
415 See Robert B. Ahdieh, From "Federalization" to "Mixed Governance" in
Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BuFF. L. REV. 721, 747 (2005) (citing
Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Market Development and Long-Run Growth, 10
WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 323 (1996)).
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companies, but not for hedge funds. A major reason for SOX was
the collapse of Enron.416 Before its collapse, Enron had converted
itself into an energy trading company and was acting similarly to a
hedge fund trading in derivatives. 417 Despite the hedge-fund-like
behavior exhibited by Enron, SOX failed to extend its regulatory
coverage to hedge funds.
1. Meaningful, But Reasonable Disclosures Needed
Disclosure of information is necessary to encourage more due
diligence by the investors, creditors, and other parties in a
financial or business transaction.418 Market discipline is effective
when creditors and private counter-parties have both the incentives
and the abilities to evaluate the true riskiness of hedge funds
investments, investment strategies, management abilities, and
recent financial results.4 19  Clear disclosure allows investors to
make better, more informed judgments. 420 Fair evaluation requires
accurate accounting, reporting, and disclosure. More frequent and
meaningful disclosure of material financial information from
hedge funds is needed.42'
Opinions differ on the type of information hedge funds should
416 For a discussion of the activities of Enron that led to passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, see Collapse of Enron: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science,
& Transportation, 107th Cong. 29-40 (2002) (statement of William C. Powers, Member,
Enron Board of Directors, Chairman, Special Investigation Committee).
417 See The Fall of Enron: How Could It Have Happened?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 103-34 (2002) (statement of Frank
Partnoy, Professor, Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law).
418 Ironically, some disclosure of confidential information may occur unexpectedly
through the private sector. See lanthe Jeanne Dugan, Hedge Fund Managers Are
Furious Over Effort to Sell Trading Histories, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2006, at C 1.
419 In 2005, The Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group called for more
disclosure by hedge funds to banks and prime brokers. See CRM POLICY GROUP II,
supra note 6, at 13-18. The Group wants disclosure of details of hedge funds' trading
philosophies, risk management systems, and market positions. See id.; Pierre Paulden,
Corrigan Goes on Blow-up Patrol, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 2005, at 9.
420 In 2005, the SEC began to require funds to disclose other types of accounts run
by any registered investment adviser. Eleanor Laise, Is Your Hedge Fund Manager
Two-Timing You?; As Hedge and Mutual Funds Increasingly Share Overseers, Critics
Fret About Small Investors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2006, at D1. The disclosure occurs in a
"Statement of Additional Information." Id. This information is designed to enable the
investor to determine what conflicts of interest might exist. Id.
421 WORKING GROUP REPORT I, supra note 46, at 32-33.
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disclose through registration. One securities industry expert has
suggested that every hedge fund provide investors with a
standardized chart of its annual performance, as well as the fees
for each hedge fund in the portfolio. 422 The hedge fund advisers'
professional qualifications, any material conflicts of interest, the
fund's investment strategies, and any redemption restrictions on
423the underlying hedge funds should also be disclosed. Some
advocate the disclosure by hedge funds of monthly returns, the
extent of leverage, assets under management, instruments traded,
and all brokerage, financing, and credit relationships.424 Arguably,
smaller hedge funds should not have to reveal their portfolio
holdings, while larger ones might have to provide basic
information about their assets because they are more likely to
425present systemic risk to the financial markets. Thus, the
regulation requirements could vary based on the size of the hedge
fund investments, their potential impact on the market, and
international agreements on disclosure of hedge fund investment
426
risks.
A system of disclosure for hedge funds could be implemented
through a statement similar to an abbreviated "management's
discussion and analysis" (MD&A), as required by the SEC for
public companies. 42  The purpose of this additional disclosure is
to enable the investor to assess the quality of the earnings, the
profitability of the fund, and whether previous operating results
can fairly predict future performance. 42  Included in the MD&A
422 The U.K. requires that hedge fund managers complete forms detailing their
business plans and describing the capital that they hold to cover liabilities. Managers
must also disclose personal information, such as whether they have criminal records.
See Scannell et al., supra note 371, at C2.
423 See Roel C. Campos, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the Managed
Funds Association (July 12, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch071205rcc.htm.
424 See Getmansky et al., supra note 139, at 30.
425 E.g., FOFs often disclose only their ten top holdings to potential investors. See
Gaber et al., supra note 231, at 330.
426 The United States has a "multi-jurisdictional disclosure system" with Canada.
Ruth 0. Kuras, Harmonization of Securities Regulation Standards Between Canada and
the United States, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 465, 468-70 (2004).
427 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2007).
428 SEC Guidance on MD&A, Securities Act Release No. 8350, Exchange Act
Release No. 48,960, Financial Reporting Release No. 72 [2003-2004 Transfer Binder]
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of public companies is also a "statement of risks." Hedge funds
could supply a similar statement of risks, beyond the initial
offering, to provide better transparency of their trading
philosophies, activities, and risks taken.43°
Critics of disclosure are properly concerned that the extent of
required disclosure of regulated investments is often excessive,
creating "an acute information overload problem.' 4 31 While the
management of any entity generally refers little disclosure so as
not to limit managerial discretion, the management of hedge
funds will adjust to new disclosure requirements, as have
management of other entities. Yet, the SEC should review the
information that it requires the investor to disclose to determine if
all the information is really necessary. Hopefully,. the SEC can
scale back some of the unnecessary disclosure required of all
entities and refocus on maximizing the transparency and
understandability of the financial information made available to
the ordinary investor.
Consider the desired disclosure of compensation paid to hedge
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 87,127, at 88,888-89 (Dec. 19, 2003).
429 A private placement memorandum is given to investors before an investment is
made, and that memorandum generally includes a brief statement of risks. See SEC
STAFF, 2003 REP., supra note 11, at 47-48.
430 It is time to implement the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's
recommendation of a new financial statement that provides quantitative information
about the overall market risk of an entity. Cf. Disclosure of Accounting Policies For
Derivative Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments and Disclosure
of Quantitative and Qualitative Information About Market Risk Inherent in Derivative
Financial Instruments, Other Financial Instruments, and Derivative Commodity
Instruments, Securities Act Release No. 7386, Exchange Act Release No. 38,223,
Investment Company Act Release No. 22,487, Financial Reporting Release No. 48, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,448 (Jan. 31, 1997). A private industry study group believes
that investment managers and fiduciaries need to form generally accepted techniques for
supplying risk characterization data. See CRM POLICY GROUP II, supra note 6, at D-4.
The goal is to provide sufficient information for an independent analysis of credit and
market risk undertaken by the institutional investors. See id.
431 See CRM POLICY GROUP II, supra note 6, at C- 1. Also, more harmonization of
disclosure requirements is needed. Id. at C-3. Some believe the SEC registration form
asks for everything and is "onerous and intrusive." Jesse Eisinger, Long & Short: A
David Toppled Hedge-Fund Rule, But Was Goliath Really So Bad?, WALL ST. J., June
28, 2006, at C1.
432 Robert Prentice, Whether Securities Regulation! Some Behavioral Observations
Regarding Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L. J. 1397, 1423 (2002).
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fund advisors.433 The huge financial incentives for highly paid
hedge fund managers provide great pressure for business or
434accounting manipulations. These financial incentives are
similar to the problematic fees paid to the auditors who failed to
remain independent, perform proper audits, and detect the
corporate wrongdoing that led to the corporate scandals of the
early 2000s. n35  One chief executive officer has characterized the
exorbitant fees paid to hedge fund advisers as creating an
investment business scam.436 The excessive compensation paid to
hedge fund advisers has contributed to the illegal secret deals
involving inappropriate market timing and late trading that stole
profits from other mutual fund investors. Further disclosures can
help the market effectively reduce the outrageous fees paid to
hedge funds.
4 37
Congress and the SEC should take measures that help to deter
inappropriate practices from reoccurring in hedge funds in the438
future. Requiring the disclosure of securities owned personally
by hedge fund advisers, as is currently required of mutual fund
433 E.g., the United States requires that fund managers make a good faith
determination that the commissions paid are reasonable relative to the value of the
products and services provided by the broker-dealers and relative to the fund manager's
responsibilities. See Soft Dollar Advice, Exchange Act Release No. 54,165 [2006
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 87,616, at 83,355 (July 18, 2006). Where
compensation to the manager is based on performance of the fund, the compensation is
limited to the "fulcrum fees." See 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-2 (2007). Cf Ron Orol, Senate
Comm. Approves Limit on Executive Comp. Plans, DAILY DEAL, Jan. 18, 2007
(discussing the Senate Finance Committee's proposal of limiting executives to $1
million of tax-free compensation per year).
434 An academic study of companies with chief executive officers who received
ninety-two percent or more of their pay in stock options found that approximately twenty
percent of these companies had misstated financial statements within the previous five
years. Floyd Norris, Stock Options: Do They Make Bosses Cheat?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5,
2005, at Cl (discussing a study by Jared Harris and Philip Bromley of the University of
Minnesota that was presented at the Academy of Management).
435 See David Skeel, The Ghost of a Crisis in Equity Funds Hides Real Benefit, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006, at 19.
436 William C. Symonds, Husbanding That $27 Billion, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 27,
2004, at 119.
437 For example, the world's largest hedge fund, the Man Group, has cut its
performance fees in half. See GUIZOT, supra note 151, at 32.
438 Selva Ozelli, Taxing Mutual Fund Scandal Fines and Penalties, ACCT. TODAY,
Oct. 11, 2004, at 13.
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advisers,4 9 could help make some potential conflicts of interest
more apparent and less likely to create problems for investors.
2. Other Needed Rules of Conduct, Governance, and Tax
Reform
Market integrity regulation provides rules for conducting
business. It involves creating reasonable entry restrictions, such as
licensing, improving governance, and enhancing fiduciary
responsibilities. 440  Proper tax reform can also reinforce more
market integrity in the hedge fund industry and the financial
markets they affect.
Proper conduct of business should require hedge funds to
produce audited financial statements. Before 2006, many hedge
funds did not have audited financial statements which complied
with GAAP, despite the huge sums of money invested in hedge
funds.44' "Responsibility for ensuring that financial reports
comply with accounting standards [primarily] rests with the
officers and directors of the reporting enterprise.' 442 Just as chief
executive officers and chief financial officers of public companies
have to certify financial statements of public companies, 3 so
should hedge fund managers have to certify their financial
statements. If the financial statements provided to investors are
significantly distorted, investors are more likely to misallocate
capital from worthy investments to other, less secure investments
with distorted financial statements. Both investors and society
439 Mutual funds must disclose how many of their managers own fund shares and
their stake in fund performance. See Portfolio Manager Disclosures, Securities Act
Release No. 8458, Exchange Act Release No. 50,227, Investment Company Act Release
No. 26,533 [2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 87,250, at 80,861-63
(Aug. 23, 2004).
440 CARMICHAEL & POMERLEANO, supra note 392, at 26.
441 Even when audits of hedge funds have occurred, the auditing is not as reliable
because hedge fund transactions present extensive challenges for auditors. Barbara
Davison, An Audit View of Hedge Funds, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Dec. 2006, at 75.
442 FASB Derivative Accounting Standards, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 108th Cong. 12 (2003) (statement of Leslie F. Seidman, Member, Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd.). Auditors of financial statements have secondary
responsibility. Id. For public enterprises, the SEC is ultimately responsible. Id.
443 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2000).
[Vol. XXXI
REGULATING HEDGE FUNDS
suffer from disregarding the real opportunity costs of capital. 44
Reasonable entry restrictions on hedge fund managers should
exist to ensure that hedge fund advisers understand their legal
requirements and have the minimum acceptable professional
credentials needed to understand the financial products they might
use. Although this entry restriction regulation cannot detect all
scam-artists and incompetent hedge fund managers, it should help
to eliminate some of the worst managers and further
professionalize other hedge fund advisers.
Various governance reforms are needed for hedge funds,
including some reforms similar to those in SOX.44 5 Governance
reforms could create greater integrity in the financial reporting by
hedge funds and, in turn, more efficient capital markets.
Arnelle Guizot, a former hedge fund insider, advocates three
corporate governance reforms for every hedge fund: (1) an
independent board chairman447 and a board comprised of at least
two-thirds independent directors, (2) a chief compliance officer
(CCO) who reports directly to the board, and (3) an independent
audit committee. 448  Other major governance changes that are
needed for hedge funds include requiring hedge funds to report
and disclose the hedge fund side-letters to preferred investors.
449
444 See Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the 25th
Annual USC Leventhal School of Accounting SEC and Financial Reporting Institute
Conference: Complexity in Financial Reporting and Disclosure Regulation (June 8,
2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch060806cag.htm.
445 One low-cost governance concept is to require hedge funds to publish their codes
of ethics. See 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2000); 17 C.F.R. §'229.406 (2007); Disclosure
Required By Sections 404, 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities
Act Release No. 8177, Exchange Act Release No. 47,235 [2002-2003 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 86,818, at 86,894-98 (Jan. 23, 2003).
446 Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections and Audits in
the Post-SOX Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming fall 2007).
447 A board chair is important in setting the agenda and establishing a culture of
enhanced independence between the fund manager and the board. Investment Company
Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 26,520 [2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) [ 87,243, at 80,803 (July 27, 2004).
448 GuIZOT, supra note 151.
449 In 2006, the United Kingdom required hedge funds to report side agreements
that give preferential treatment to selected clients. Neil Behrmann, Hedge Funds Must
Report Side Letters to UK Regulators by October 31, INFOVEST21 NEWS, Sept. 28, 2006.
In a survey of hedge fund executives, Ernst & Young found that two-thirds provide side
letters to their investors and one-third were increasing the disclosure of such letters. See
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Also, the SEC should restrict voting in companies to beneficial
owners, so that hedge funds cannot engage in "empty voting."
450
Fiduciary responsibilities are more likely fulfilled when there
are proper compliance controls. Insufficient compliance controls
for hedge funds is one problem institutional investors frequently
cite.451  Once registered, hedge fund advisers must institute
comprehensive compliance procedures and designate a CCO.
However, the SEC asserts that these internal compliance measures
are just the first line of defense in protecting investors against an
adviser's misconduct. 452  Fulfillment of fiduciary responsibilities
among hedge funds and their institutional investors can help
manage potential conflicts of interest.
Hedge-fund-specific penalties for fraudulent conduct are
needed to deter wrongful conduct from hedge fund managers.453
Because hedge funds hold such substantial assets, the penalties
created under Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)454 for fraud or
Chidam Kurdas, Side Letters Become More Popular, HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Dec.
12, 2006. Side letters generally ease withdrawal rights, give preferential pricing, reduce
fees, or give the investor the ability to add funds when new investors are prohibited to do
so. Id.
450 See Hu & Black, Empty Voting, supra note 203, at 1049.
451 SEC Hedge Fund Adviser Rule, supra note 40, at 72,064.
452 Id. at 72,079. Congress should imitate the whistle-blowing protection provisions
of SOX for individuals who supply important information about hedge fund fraud,
insider trading, or investment advisers who engage in other illegal activities. See
Examining Enforcement of Criminal Insider Trading and Hedge Fund Activity, supra
note 228, at 1247 (statement of Richard Blumenthal, Att'y Gen., State of Conn.). Cf. 18
U.S.C. § 1514A (2000) (protecting whistleblowers in publicly traded companies).
Because hedge fund firms are small, hedge fund auditors should have the responsibility
of overseeing the process by which whistleblower complaints about accounting or
auditing matters are addressed. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(k) (2000) (setting forth current
auditor responsibilities).
453 Meaningful penalties help to create a tougher enforcement environment for the
SEC. Thus, enhanced penalties were created under SOX to deter wrongdoing. These
penalties also provided a basis for more governmental investigatory staff with
accounting and auditing expertise. See Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Remarks at the European Corporate Governance Summit: An SEC
Commissioner's View: The Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Environment for Foreign Issuers (Mar.
2, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch030205cag.htm.
454 While SOX and its penalty structure for misleading financial statements has
raised the level of compliance, problems within auditing firms continue to exist. See,
e.g., Christopher Byron, Two Faces for PWC - Firm Has One Schtick for Clients,
Another for the Lawyers, N.Y. POST, Jan. 3, 2005, at 31.
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interference in an audit are not sufficiently severe to effectively
deter the illegal conduct associated with hedge funds, their• • 455
employees, and cozy outside service providers. For example,
outside service providers for hedge funds may need additional
incentives to ensure that their independence remains firm.4 5 6
Closing the tax loopholes and incentives that tax exempt
organizations in the United States have to invest in offshore hedge
funds could also help reduce some of the opportunities for hedge
fund fraud.457 Congress could take action against tax schemes by
changing the burden of proof when income is earned from a trust
or corporation in a tax haven. 458 Congress could also change the
tax treatment of hedge fund entities, currently similar to that of
"publicly traded partnerships," so that hedge funds are no longer
treated as flow through entities. For such proposed tax changes to
be effective, however, Congress must also modify the tax
consequences for offshore investment 459 and limit the amount of
460tax-deferred compensation allowed. Otherwise, the change
455 See Diamond, supra note 248. For example, a Director of Investments, who was
an unregulated investment adviser to three hedge funds, defrauded investors. Press
Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Brings First Failure To Supervise Action Against
Principal of an Unregistered Investment Adviser to a Hedge Fund; Also Charges Hedge
Fund Director of Investments With Fraud (Dec. 15, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-172.htm. The SEC imposed only a $15,000 fine on
this hedge fund employee, beyond requiring reimbursement to hedge fund investors. Id.
Such a miniscule penalty will not deter wrongful conduct by other hedge funds.
456 Cf. Gregory Zuckerman & Peter Lattman, Research Firms' Consultant Ties
Draw Scrutiny; New York, SEC Examine Information Disclosures To Hedge Funds,
Others, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2007, at Cl (discussing the investigation of whether
research firms Gerson Lehrman Group and Vista Research possibly shared non-public
information with hedge funds).
457 For example, Congress could require tax-exempt organizations which invest
abroad to gross-up the unrelated business income tax by the tax that would have been
paid if the investment occurred within the United States.
458 See generally MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 7B. 11[2]
(rev. 2d ed. 2002).
459 Senator Carl Levin "has proposed making it easier for the [U.S.] government to
crack down on tax schemes." Editorial, Billionaire Tax Cheats Beyond the Reach of
Law, NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, Wash.), Aug. 14, 2006, at B5. He proposes to "[place]
the burden on taxpayers to prove that income from trusts or corporations in tax havens is
not taxable." Id. Senator Levin "also wants to force financial institutions to report to the
IRS when the beneficiary of [a] foreign compan[y] [or entity] is an American citizen."
Id.
460 See Howard Leventhal & Joseph Bianco, Senate Passes Deferred Compensation
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would simply push more hedge funds to relocate offshore. 46 1
Regulation that either limits the tax deductibility of fees paid
to an investment adviser (including any hedge fund adviser) or
adopts restrictions similar to those placed on mutual fund adviser
462compensation is advisable. Such regulation could reduce the
financial incentive for hedge fund managers to engage in
fraudulent activities, help create a more reasonable level of
compensation, and thus lessen the burden on the taxpayers who
indirectly subsidize tax loopholes for hedge funds and their
employees.463
With increased disclosure and other responsibilities, costs rise
for both the private sector and government. Z4 Hedge funds could
generally absorb the costs, given the exorbitant fees they are
collecting from their clients. Governments also have additional
costs from the need to examine periodically the information
disclosed. While the SEC may need more money from Congress
to handle the increased responsibilities of examining the
Limits, HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Feb. 5, 2007.
461 See Kenard, supra note 9, at 139-40.
462 See Hal Lux, Rich, Offshore, Taxable?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 2002, at
13. Similarly, the U.S. Senate is reviewing the tax treatment of interest carried by fund
managers, which is currently taxed at capital gains rates. Instead, where "carried
interest" represents the underlying income for services, it could be taxed at the higher
ordinary income tax rates. Sarah Lueck, Senate Aides Weigh Hedge-Fund Tax Changes,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2007, at C2.
463 If an investment adviser is registered, then (s)he is prohibited under the
Investment Advisers Act from charging a performance fee to clients who are not
"qualified clients." 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (2007). A qualified client must have a net
worth of more than $1.5 million or "at least $750,000 under the management of the
investment adviser." Id. Investment advisors must look through a fund to determine that
all investors are qualified clients before they charge a performance fee. Id.
464 The SEC underestimated the private costs of increased disclosure under the
Advisers Act, characterizing them as significant, but reasonable. The SEC had estimated
the added costs created for hedge fund advisers as "$20,000 in professional fees and
$25,000 in internal costs, including staff time." SEC Hedge Fund Adviser Rule, supra
note 40, at 72,063 n. 112. However, the SEC noted that "several hedge fund advisers
estimated the costs to be in the range of $300,000." Id. at 72,081. The higher cost was
mostly attributable to "compensation costs for hiring a dedicated chief compliance
officer (CCO)." Id. at 72,081. Total costs for all hedge funds was estimated at $44
million. Letter from Kathleen E. Wannisky, Managing Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gov't
Accountability Office, to Sen. Richard C. Shelby, Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes, Rep. Michael
G. Oxley & Rep. Barney Frank (Dec. 20, 2004) (enclosure),
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/majrule/d05222r.pdf.
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465disclosures by hedge funds, SEC Commissioner Atkins'
argument that hedge fund registration would unduly divert
resources from the oversight of mutual funds, which benefits
investors who are less wealthy,466 is specious. Pension plans are
investing in both hedge funds and mutual funds, and thus both
467require SEC examination.
VI. Conclusion
Hedge funds are a vital part of the financial system, but they
pose substantial risks to both the stability of the financial markets
and the capital preservation of investors. While the financial
markets have radically changed in the last sixty-five years with
increased globalization and technological sophistication, the laws
governing securities have not. Our market continues to operate
under securities laws primarily drafted during the Great
Depression. The SEC must abandon its Depression-era mentality
and propose meaningful regulations for hedge funds. The SEC's
anti-fraud regulation does not go far enough to ensure that all
individual and institutional investors receive government help at a
level sufficient to maintain the integrity of, and attract capital
investment in, the global financial markets. 468 Properly regulated
markets help to maintain stability in the financial markets, provide
safety for all investors, and provide access to relevant information
for greater market efficiency.
465 Bloomberg News, SEC Plans Database on Hedge Trading, AMERICAN BANKER,
Dec. 6, 2006, at 18. Precedent exists from SOX for giving the SEC additional funding
when its responsibilities are increased. Thus, funding decisions should not drive the
debate about whether the SEC should have the power to examine hedge funds.
466 See Paul S. Atkins, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the 9th Annual
Alternative Investment Roundup (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/
spch012907psa.htm (discussing his dissent to the SEC's rule requiring registration of
hedge fund managers).
467 Opponents to hedge fund regulation apparently also assume that the SEC will not
acquire added resources for additional responsibilities, unlike the precedent set under
SOX.
468 "Investors increasingly are trading in other countries besides their own."
Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Keynote address at the International
Organization of Securities Commissioners Technical Committee Conference: 'The
Hunters and the Stag': Why National Securities Regulators Must Collaborate In the Era
of Global Investing (Nov. 16, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/
spch 1 1606cc.htm.
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More effective SEC regulation of hedge funds can reduce
systemic risk, protect investors, and ensure market efficiency.
Prudential regulation is needed to prevent market failures. Market
integrity regulation is essential to reduce the opportunity for fraud
from complex hedge fund financial transactions. Any additional
regulation should also require hedge funds to register with the
government to ensure compliance with fiduciary duties, adviser
qualification requirements, and increased disclosure to create more
efficient markets. SEC registration of hedge funds provides
several benefits, such as requiring that all hedge funds use GAAP
and audited financial statements. A coordinated international
approach in regulating hedge funds will best enable the SEC to
protect global financial market stability and promote integrity in
the global financial markets.
